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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this research was to utilize the concept of hubris to frame a discussion of differences between collegiate athletes and collegiate non-athletes. Surveys were distributed to a collegiate student population that included both athletes and non-athletes and included questions that served as proxies for varying dimensions of hubris, such as perceptions of campus police (conventional authority structures) and taking measures of self-protection (feelings of invulnerability), while controlling for race and gender. Statistical results indicate that contrary to the previous ideas, college athletes have better perceptions of campus authority structures. Significant differences are identified and discussed between male athletes and male non-athletes; male athletes and female athletes; and minority athletes and minority non-athletes. In accordance with previous ideas, athletes take fewer measures of self protection relating to feelings of invulnerability. These conclusions are significant across racial categories and between male and female athletes, but do not relate to differences between female athletes and female non-athletes. As a way of interpreting the results, the author advocates the integration of interdisciplinary theoretical frameworks.

INTRODUCTION
With the increasing commercialization of college sports (Sperber, 2000; Upthegrove, Rosicigno, & Zubrinsky, 1999), elite athletes have the potential to develop larger-than-life personalities (Coakley, 2004). Indeed, Bob Knight and Bill Self (basketball coaches in the Big XII) both agree college sports has become a large, profitable industry as exemplified by the multibillion-dollar contract the NCAA has with CBS to air the men’s basketball tournament (“Knight, Big 12 coaches”). On a related note, Adler and Adler (1999) show how college athletes deal with the fame, spotlight, and attention of being elite athletes on a college campus. Oftentimes, athletes developed aggrandized views of themselves and were set apart from the rest of the collegiate community (Adler & Adler, 1999). As a result of being separated from their community setting, athletes have the potential to develop extreme personalities that do not strictly adhere to current norms, values, or laws of society. These extreme personalities may result in athletes’ feeling invulnerable and/or disobeying current authority structures.

Cox (2007) states athletes and non-athletes differ based on many personality characteristics. Athletes often believe they are invincible, above the law, or incapable of being hurt (Goodman, 1995; McMahon, 2004). Elite athletes, especially in performance sports, exhibit more competitiveness (Cox, 2007) and thrill-seeking behavior, which demonstrates invincibility or invulnerability (Patel & Luckstead, 2000). Examples of athletes engaging in high-risk behaviors include Ben Roethlisberger and Kellen Winslow (from the National Football League) and Corey Lidle and Thurman Munson (from Major League Baseball). Roethlisberger and Winslow were seriously injured while riding high performance motorcycles (“Browns GM: Risk-taking athletes,” 2006), while Munson and Lidle were killed piloting small airplanes (Weinbaum, 2006). In conjunction with feelings of invulnerability, some elite athletes have a decreased acceptance of current authority figures and structures, resulting in criminal activity, deviant behavior, and the belief that the “jock culture” supersedes current authority structures (Safai, 2002).

Athletes engaging in deviant behavior and violating laws is nothing new in American culture (Leonard, 1998). Elite athletes displaying a pride-driven arrogance, an inflated sense of self, and decreased ac-
ceptance of current authority structures are byproducts of social dynamics operating within athletic cultures (Coakley, 2006). Within collegiate sports, for example, “male college student-athletes, compared to the rest of the male population, are responsible for a significantly higher percentage of sexual assaults reported to judicial affairs on the campuses of Division I institutions” (Benedict-Cross Study cited in Locklear 2003). Other high-profile examples of college athletes allegedly engaging in deviant or criminal behavior include the recent Duke Lacrosse scandal and alleged rape (Wilson & Bernstein, 2006), sexual assault by an Arizona State football player (Scott & Kiefer, 2006), and using sex, alcohol, and drugs to recruit football players at the University of Colorado (Steinberger, 2005). Moreover, Manning (2005) notes athletes competing in team-oriented sports have a lower level of moral judgment, while Feezell (2004) speaks of the term “athlete” as meaning a unique individual differentiated from his/her surroundings based solely upon his/her physical abilities. The connection between athletes being revered, unique, separated, and somehow different from the people around them is difficult to understand and needs further elaboration.

The popularity of college sports is an important factor in determining how athletes develop identities and interact with the communities around them (Adler & Adler, 1999). Additionally, Coakley (2006) notes coaches often, “create team environments that keep athletes in a perpetual state of adolescence” (p. 165). Environments that mirror states of adolescence are often characterized by feelings of invulnerability and a decreased respect for current authority structures (Patel & Luckstead, 2000). As a result, the focus of this research is to determine if differences exist between collegiate athletes and collegiate non-athletes in relation to their acceptance of legitimated authority structures and feelings of invulnerability.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Coakley (2004) uses the Greek word *hubris* to describe elite athletes’ “sense of being unique and extraordinary” and how “it may be expressed in terms of pride-driven arrogance, an inflated sense of power and importance, and a public persona that communicates superiority and even insolence” (p. 173). The hubris in athletes can result in feelings of invulnerability to decreased levels of respect for authority structures. Hughes and Coakley (1991) note how athletes subscribe to norms and values that are embodied in sport, not in the larger societal context, and this contributes to the development of hubris. Specifically, this set of norms and values is called the sport ethic and includes tenants such as: 1) sacrificing for ‘the game’, 2) seeking individual distinction, 3) taking risks, and 4) challenging personal limits and possibilities (Hughes & Coakley, 1991).

An unquestioned acceptance of these ideals may lead an athlete to engage in positive deviance, which results from an “unqualified commitment to the sport ethic” (Coakley, 2004, p. 172). Specifically, the group dynamics present in team sports aid in bonding athletes together, thereby normalizing the overconformity to the sport ethic (Leonard, 1998). Commitment to the “team” and the sport ethic appears to take precedence over society’s norms and values, resulting in “overconformity” (Hughes & Coakley, 1991; Coakley, 2004). Because of the closeness and the commitment required to stay a part of these elite teams, athletes are separated from the social environments in which they are embedded creating a sense of mystery and admiration from the surrounding community. These dynamics and the cyclical nature of being select, elite athletes exacerbate the concept of hubris. Coakley (2004) illustrates how this cycle is perpetuated:

After all, they [elite athletes] are told this day after day by everyone from coaches to team boosters to autograph seekers. They read it in newspapers and magazines, and they see it on TV and the Internet...we see that much of the deviance in sports is not motivated primarily by the desire to win or to make money. Instead, it is motivated by desires to play the game, to be an athlete, and to maintain membership in an elite athletic in-group. (pp. 173-4)
Due to the feelings of superiority (i.e., hubris), commercialization of college sports (Upthegrove, Rosscigno, Zubrinski, 1999), and the high premium placed on college athletics in American culture (Washington & Karen, 2001) elite athletes can potentially develop a sense of uniqueness, separation, and arrogance.

Invulnerability and Authority
On collegiate campuses a centralized and dominant authority structure is the campus police (Lanier, 1995). Research indicates the way students perceive campus police officers is related to their perception of effective and legitimate authority within a campus community (Trojanowicz, Benson, & Trojanowicz, 1988). As a result, perceptions of authority structures on campus can be measured by measuring perceptions of the campus police. Additionally, taking measures of self-protection while on campus to avoid campus crime victimization represents a student’s perceived level of care, safety, and vulnerability (Fisher, 1995). Conversely, individuals that do not actively engage in taking measures of self-protection can have more feelings of invulnerability. The aforementioned concept of hubris, if present within the collegiate student-athlete population, would greatly affect perceptions of authority (i.e., campus police), invulnerability (i.e., taking measures of self-protection while on campus), and potentially levels of victimization. Throughout the literature (e.g. Brown & Benedict, 2002), there are two salient individual-level variables influencing an individual’s respect for authority and feelings of invulnerability, which can be usefully applied to college athletes. The two variables are gender and race.

Within college athletics, gender is an important factor in determining how female athletes are viewed and feel about themselves (Coakley, 2006). Women’s college sports are imitating the institutionalized center of male sports by adopting many of the same dynamics and characteristics in hopes of achieving similar popularity levels (Messner, 2002). Similarly, female athletes are adopting the values and traits of male athletes. For example, Young (1997) notes female athletes in power and performance sports, such as rugby, basketball, and wrestling, have embraced the physicality and potential violence within their sport, while still retaining their “feminine” identity. As a result, female athletes are moving away from current social definitions that women should not be involved in physical or aggressive activities (Young, 1997). If hubris is prominent in male sports and female sports are evolving along the lines of male sports, then the potential for female athletes to exhibit feelings of invulnerability is greatly enhanced.

Additionally, gender is a relevant concept when examining perceptions of campus police authorities. Brown and Benedict (2002) note while men are more likely to be arrested, women are much more likely to be victimized, especially on college campuses (Fox & Hellman, 1985; Henson & Stone, 1999; Volkwein, Szelest, & Lizotte 1995). Higher rates of victimization (i.e., females) and higher arrest rates (i.e., males) are both associated with negative views of authority organizations (Brown & Benedict, 2002). Female athletes’ perceptions of campus crime, victimization, or campus police officers, however, have never been adequately examines. When examined through the conceptual framework of hubris, female and male athletes could have similar perceptions of authority figures.

The athlete’s race is another characteristic that could influence hubris in college athletes. The relevance of race to college athletics is often noted in the disproportionate number of high-profile athletes that are African-American and the overall lack of African-American college coaches and administrators (Coakley, 2006; Sage, 1998). In addition Edwards (1985) and Lapchick (2001) address exploitation of African-American athletes within both professional and college athletics.

A focus on identity formation is crucial for developing a relationship between hubris and race within sport. Concerning identity formation in sport, Lawrence (2005) notes the importance of team cohesion in team sports and the role race plays in developing athlete’s experiences. Specifically, teammates’
race, while important and influential to team dynamics, is embedded within the team’s feelings of togetherness. Additionally, African-American athletes felt a sense of empowerment because of their participation in sports, while simultaneously maintaining the belief that being African-American was superior to being white and provided them specific athletic skills in certain sports (Lawrence, 2005). Indeed, Coakley (2006) notes how some young African-American males “believe their destiny is to play [sports] better than anyone else, especially whites” (p. 290). Majors (1986) identified the concept of “cool pose” to describe the tough, in-control, and invulnerable nature of African-American males. This unique presentation of self is the ultimate portrayal of masculinity for this group (Coakley, 2006).

The concept of hubris, when combined with previous research, can be very useful for isolating how an athlete’s race affects their feelings of invulnerability.

Additionally, race is influential in perceptions of campus police authorities. In a study of college campus crime Miller and Pan (1987) note that positive attitudes towards the police tended to vary based on race; that is, African-Americans tended to have more negative views of the police than their white counterparts. On a related note Berry and Smith (2000) note African-American athletes are overrepresented in not only crime statistics, but also as criminal sport figures in the media. This media representation allows society to expect African-American athletes to disobey the law more compared to other athletes (Berry & Smith, 2000). Since African-Americans feel empowered by sports (Lawrence, 2005), are socially expected to engage in crime as athletes (Berry & Smith, 2000), and have more negative views towards campus police authorities, the concept of hubris would be a relevant influence on perceptions of authority figures.

Research Questions
Hubris is a concept that further elaborates how athletes may feel invulnerable and have decreased acceptance of authority figures. Additionally, both the gender and race of the individual affects feelings of invulnerability and acceptance of authority structures. When focusing on college athletes the most public form of authority for a campus community is that of the campus police. While on a campus, feelings of invulnerability could result in avoiding measures of self-protection. Therefore, based upon the previous literature and the aforementioned discussion of conceptual ideas, the following research questions are posed:

1) Do athletes and non-athletes differ in their perceptions of institutionalized authority security agencies and in their feelings of vulnerability on campus?
2) Regarding perceptions of institutionalized authority/security agencies and in their feelings of invulnerability on campus, do differences exist between female athletes and female non-athletes, male athletes and male non-athletes, and male athletes and female athletes?
3) Regarding perceptions of institutionalized authority/security agencies and in their feelings of invulnerability on campus, do differences exist between minority athletes and minority non-athletes, white athletes and white non-athletes, and white athletes and minority athletes?

METHODOLOGY
Measures
To investigate differences between college athletes and the rest of the student body pertaining to perceptions of the police, victimization rates, and taking measures of self-protection, a survey was constructed. Specifically, the survey contains a scale to measure perceptions of the police, which serves as a proxy for adherence to and perceptions of institutionalized authority structures- a key element to the idea of hubris. The scale is composed of eleven statements that are measured using summed Likert-scale responses, such as “Strongly Agree,” “Agree,” “Disagree,” and “Strongly Disagree.” The category of “Neutral” was omitted in order to avoid an acquiescence bias from respon-
dents (Nardi 2003). Each mixed-worded response was given a number. For example, respondents that that chose “Strongly Agree” were given a score of four (4); “Agree” were given a score of three (3), “Disagree” were given a score of (2), and “Strongly Disagree” were given a score of one (1). Respondent’s answers were tabulated along the scale resulting in a numerical score for each respondent that varied from a score of eleven (11), which was considered low, to forty-four (44), which was considered high. The higher the score per respondent, the better their perception is of campus police officers.

The scale was adapted from Love (1973), which measures adolescents’ perception of police officers. Brodsky and O’Neil (1983) note the scale has demonstrated good reliability and appears to have good face validity. For this particular analysis the scale, after being altered to fit the designated population, demonstrated an extremely strong cronbach alpha level, which measures the inter-correlation reliability of a scale (Nardi, 2003). When applied to this sample, the scale’s reliability analysis revealed an acceptable alpha level of .85.

In addition to the perceptions of the police scale, the survey contains a section of demographics questions. These questions included respondents self-reporting their age, race/ethnicity, residence, participation in a university sanctioned sport, and gender. This demographic data is useful in providing univariate statistics that describe the sample being used.

Another section of the survey contains questions about measures of self-protection and serves as a proxy for invulnerability- another key dimension of hubris. The more ‘invulnerable’ the respondent feels, the fewer measures of self-protection they will take while on campus. Specifically, this section illustrates how often students on campus take measures of self-protection, including carrying objects (such as keys) in a defensive manner, walking with someone while on campus, avoiding certain areas on campus at night, and attending crime prevention workshops. These statements are measured using Likert-type responses and include categories of “Always,” “Often,” “Sometimes,” “Rarely,” and “Never.” The category of “Neutral” was omitted in order to avoid an acquiescence bias from respondents (Nardi, 2003). Each mixed-worded response was given a number. For example, respondents that that chose “Always” were given a score of four (4); “Often” were given a score of three (3), “Sometimes” were given a score of (2), and “Never” were given a score of one (1). Respondent’s answers were tabulated along the scale resulting in a numerical score for each respondent that varied from a score of four (4), which was considered low, to sixteen (16), which was considered high. When applied to this sample, the scale’s reliability analysis demonstrated an acceptable alpha level of .62.

The third section on the survey deals with crime victimization. These questions are broad in scope and merely measure the presence of crime victimization in reference to the respondent. Specifically, respondents are asked whether they have ever been assaulted, had property stolen, had property vandalized, or been subject to verbal harassment- all common forms of victimization within a campus setting (Fisher, 1995). The possible responses include answers of “Yes,” which was labeled as one (1) or “No,” which was labeled as two (2). The responses are then summed together to form a ‘campus crime victimization index’. A higher score on this index, which ranged from four (4) to eight (8), indicates a higher level of not being victimized (a.k.a. safety) on campus.

Subjects
Subjects for the study were selected from the student population of a large, state university located in the southern high plains of the United States. The university has a Division IA athletic program, which competes annually at the highest level of NCAA athletics. Students were selected from a restrictive sample of lower and upper division Arts and Sciences classes. Introductory courses are used because of their large size (anywhere from 65-300 persons per class), diversity of majors, number of student-athletes in these classes, and their representativeness of the student population. Durkin,
Wolfe, and Clark (2005) note that large “introduction” courses provide a great deal of information and are representative, in general, of the student population. Upper division courses (i.e., 4000 and 5000 level courses) are selected in addition to introductory courses to further increase diversity. Once the surveys were collected, they were coded and entered into SPSS in order to develop an electronic database. Surveys with missing (skipped) questions or ambiguous answers were thrown out and not included in the database. As a result, over five hundred surveys are used in the analysis (N=518).

RESULTS
The following section displays univariate, bivariate, and multivariate results. Univariate results are given to provide description of the sample used. T-tests are used to measure bivariate differences in mean scores between athletes and non-athletes, which addresses research question #1. Multivariate results are given as mean differences between athletes and non-athletes, via t-tests, while controlling for gender and race. These results address research questions #2 and #3 respectively.

UNIVARIATE RESULTS
Almost half of the sample self-identified as being freshmen (45.4%), while sophomores, juniors, seniors, and graduate students make up 19.1%, 18.1%, 16.8% and 0.6% of the sample respectively (see Table 1). In addition, the sample reported being composed of more females than males (52.7% vs. 47.3%), slightly more non-athletes compared to athletes (51.5% vs. 48.5%), and comprised of more full-time students compared to part-time students (97.7% vs. 2.3%). There were an equal number of students in the sample that self-reported living in university owned housing (i.e., dorms) and living off-campus (50% vs. 50%). The sample is mostly white, non-Hispanic compared to non-white minority group members (80.5% vs. 19.5%) and the average age of the sample was 20.27 years old. These descriptive results are not only useful, but are also in-line with similar demographic characteristics of the university.

BIVARIATE RESULTS
In order to locate basic differences within the sample, a bivariate analysis is conducted. Specifically, in order to differentiate between two groups within a sample, a t-test is conducted. The t-test will locate differences between the dichotomous groups as directed by the previous literature. The resulting groups are athletes and non-athletes in the collegiate student population, and are used to answer research question #1: Do athletes and non-athletes differ in their perceptions of institutionalized authority/security agencies and in their feelings of vulnerability on campus? The scales and indexes measuring perceptions of campus police, taking measures of self-protection, and victimization are variables used as indicators to measure the concept of hubris (see Table 2).

Table 2 notes that athletes, regardless of race or gender, compared to non-athletes have a higher score on the perceptions of police scale (24.13 vs. 22.85), which means athletes in this sample have a better perception of the campus police. The mean difference is statistically significant (p<0.001). In addition, non-athletes report taking more measures of self-protection (9.03 vs. 8.26), which is also statistically significant (p<0.05). While athletes report being slightly safer on campus (7.77 vs. 7.75), this relationship is not statistically significant. In order to further examine hubris within the sample of collegiate athletes and non-athletes, multivariate results are presented.

MULTIVARIATE RESULTS
Multivariate analyses are conducted by using mean differences, via t-tests, between athletes and non-athletes while controlling for gender and race. These multivariate results, while basic in nature, help to further expand the explanatory power of the concept of hubris. The following analysis attempts to answer research question #2: Regarding perceptions of institutionalized authority/security agencies and in their feelings of invulnerability on campus, do differences exist between female athletes and female non-athletes, male athletes and male non-athletes, and male athletes and female athletes?
Table 3 illustrates mean differences between male athletes and male non-athletes. The results find male athletes have a better perception of the campus police (24.90 vs. 23.53), which is statistically significant (p<0.05). While male athletes report taking fewer measures of self-protection (6.41 vs. 6.60) and slightly higher safety rates on campus (7.72 vs. 7.53), these differences are not statistically significant.

Table 4 reports the mean differences between male athletes and female athletes. Male athletes, surprisingly, have a better perception of the campus police (24.90 vs. 23.00). This difference, moreover, is statistically significant (p<0.01). In addition, female athletes take far more measures of self-protection (11.10 vs. 6.41), which is also statistically significant (p<0.001). While female athletes are less victimized while on campus (7.86 vs. 7.72), this relationship is not statistically significant.

To further explicate the relationship of athletes and the concept of hubris, t-tests are conducted while controlling for race. Since race is one of the most important variables in the sociology of sport (Sage, 1999), its inclusion in this analysis is appropriate. Specifically, the following analysis answers research question #3: Regarding perceptions of institutionalized authority/security agencies and in their feelings of invulnerability on campus, do differences exist between minority athletes and minority non-athletes, white athletes and white non-athletes, and white athletes and minority athletes?

Table 5 identifies the mean differences between minority athletes and minority non-athletes. Specifically, minority athletes have a better perception of campus police officers (24.87 vs. 22.52) and take fewer measures of self-protection (7.22 vs. 8.92). Both of these differences are statistically significant (p<0.001 and p<0.05, respectively). While minority athletes report a greater rate of being victimized (7.60 vs. 7.67), this relationship is not statistically significant.

Table 6, on the other hand, reports mean differences between white athletes and white non-athletes. Specifically, white athletes have a better perception of campus police officer as compared to white non-athletes (24.00 vs. 22.95). This relationship is statistically significant (p<0.01). While white non-athletes report taking more measures of self-protection (9.06 vs. 8.43), and being more victimized while on campus (7.77 vs. 7.81), these relationships are not statistically significant.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The concept of hubris is an important and useful tool for analyzing how athletes interact with society (Coakley, 2004). While conventional wisdom has applied the concept of hubris to professional athletes, the purpose of this research was to apply it to collegiate athletes. If the concept of hubris accurately applies to elite Division IA college athletes, then athletes should have lower perceptions of institutionalized authority structures, such as the campus police. In addition, athletes that have hubris should feel invulnerable, which relates to taking fewer measures of self-protection and could result in higher rates of crime victimization. Additionally, mean differences between athletes and non-athletes were analyzed while controlling for gender and race.

When looking at the univariate statistical results, it is easy to see that this particular college campus is a reflection of the community within which it is located. Specifically, it is comprised of a traditionally college-aged sample with few older students (average age of sample is 20.27 years) and with an equal number of students living on and off campus (50% vs. 50%). There were slightly more non-athletes than athletes in the sample (48.5% vs. 51.5%). The breakdown based on the individual’s sex is roughly equal with slightly more females than males in the sample (52.7% vs. 47.3%). All of the demographics up to this point are in alignment with the official demographic breakdown of the university and similar to what is expected of a “traditional” college campus.

This university can be characterized as racially homogenous. Because of the homogeneity of the campus, different racial groups are coded into one “minority” category that is juxtaposed to the white...
majority. As a result, the sample was 80.5% for whites vs. 19.5% for non-whites. Accordingly, the sample is more diverse than the university population.

Concerning the differences between athletes and non-athletes as they may relate to hubris, results of this study run counter to some common expectations (e.g. Coakley, 2004). College athletes have better perceptions of the campus police than non-athletes (24.13 vs. 22.85, p<0.001). This indicates college athletes had a better perception of their institution’s authority structure (i.e., campus police). This finding could be the result of numerous social dynamics operating simultaneously on this campus. For example, athletes, by virtue of their high profile position on campus, could have more positive contact with campus police officers. According to the community policing literature, more positive face-to-face contact with officers “humanizes” authority figures, thereby producing better perceptions of the police (Jiao, 1997; Peak, 1995).

A final, and more logical, reason that athletes may have better perceptions of institutionalized authority structures involves their structured lives on college campuses. Specifically, athletes may have more exposure and familiarity with rigid authority structures and processes, in general (Cox, 2007). Compared to the larger student body, athletes have extremely structured environments based on hierarchical authority. Athletes are constantly being monitored by various academic services, coaching staffs within their sport, and compliance personnel. According to Stevenson (1999) elite athletes go through a process of being introduced to a sport; becoming committed to their chosen sport; and developing relationships within their chosen sport. All of these stages involve the individual athlete becoming socialized to specific authority structures (Coakley, 2006). The structured environment may expose them more too hierarchical authority, which manifests itself in a better perception of authority, including security agencies on campus like the campus police department.

In keeping with the concept of hubris, athletes took significantly fewer measures of self-protection (8.26 vs. 9.03, p<0.05). If a feeling of separation from the surrounding community results in a larger-than-life persona (Coakley, 2004), then athletes could feel “untouchable” or “invulnerable.” The invulnerability an athlete feels is a dynamic process that involves not only the athlete and team, but also the social environment in which these athletes are embedded (Adler & Adler, 1999). Avoiding measures of self-protection, could speak to “pride-driven arrogance” alluded to in the concept of hubris; that is, athletes may feel nothing, including physical, emotional, or verbal harassment or assault, can harm them while in their community. Additionally, the team dynamics produced by being associated with an elite sport (i.e., Division I A athletics) increases the togetherness of athletes producing a team dynamic based on loyalty where fellow teammates will “have their back” (Coakley, 2006; Lawrence, 2005).

GENDER AND RACE
The multivariate analyses examined mean differences, via t-test, between athletes and non-athletes across categories of gender and race. In reference to gender, male athletes had a significantly better perception of the campus police in comparison to male non-athletes. One posited reason for this difference is that male athletes may have been exposed more to authority through sports as compared to male non-athletes (Stevenson, 1999).

Moreover, male athletes had significantly better perception of the campus police when compared to female athletes. Hughes and Coakley (1991) note athletes that overconform to the sport ethic tend to be individuals that do not have well developed identities outside of their athletic status. Oftentimes, these athletes include male athletes and minority athletes in revenue generating sports (Hughes & Coakley, 1991). Elite male athletes in revenue generating sports could have exclusively athletic-based identities, which results in a win-oriented personality predicated on approval from coaches (Tusak, 2005). This need for approval, in turn, exposes the athlete to a familiarity with current institutional-
ized authority structures because of the hierarchical nature of team sports. In addition, female athletes perceive campus police officers to be less effective, which actually mirrors the lower perception of campus police officers by the larger female student population, in general (Vermillion, 2006). Female athletes’ perception of campus police officers highlights the idea that female students are more likely to be victimized, which is the strongest predictor of perceiving the police as ineffective and authoritative (Skogan & Maxfield, 1981).

Regarding race, both white athletes and non-white athletes have significantly better perceptions of the campus police as compared to their non-athlete counterparts. Here again is the reflection of athletic status and its relationship with institutionalized authority structures. Of considerable interest, however, is the fact that minority non-athletes take significantly more measures of self-protection. This result could point to many dynamics, such as minority group members having a decreased perception and reliance upon police agencies for security and safety (Brown & Benedict, 2002; Weitzer & Tuch, 1999). Individuals on a college campus who have little confidence in the campus police often take more measures of self-protection (Fisher, 1995). With non-white athletes (especially African-Americans) being disproportionately overrepresented in high profile, revenue generating sports (i.e., football and men’s basketball) minority athletes might be feeling some of the effects of hubris. That is, they may feel overtly invulnerable as a result of their athletic prestige.

Finding useful ways of interpreting such results is difficult. In an effort to provide a potentially useful theory for interpreting such conclusions, Tittle (1995) developed a theory of deviance known as “control balance” theory. In it he identified crime victimization as a result of the victim’s ability to account for crime victimization within certain situations, such as a potential of looking “weak” or “strong” based on individual characteristics. With the extreme physical conditioning required of Division I A college athletes, Tittle’s (1995) theory that takes into account the physical presence of elites can be very useful. Additionally, Tittle (1995) illustrates that celebrities and other well known individuals within a community have feelings of invulnerability and “untouchability” because others go out of their way to accommodate them (Piquero & Hickman, 2003). As applied to sports, the enormous popularity of male sports (such as men’s basketball and football) could produce a mechanism by which these particular athletes have become local celebrities (Adler & Adler, 1999), resulting in not only feelings of invulnerability, but also in positive perceptions of institutionalized authority structures (Stevenson, 1999).

While Tittle’s (1995) control balance theory addresses the invulnerability idea of hubris, it does not explicitly touch upon adherence to current authority structures. What it does do, however, is illustrate the usefulness and need for theory integration within academic research (Coakley, 2006). The conceptual idea of hubris can be strengthened by social psychological research (i.e., Cox, 2007), and sociological or criminological research (i.e., Tittle, 1995). In addition to Tittle’s (1995) theory, Sperber (2000) illustrates the influence of the sport entertainment industry upon college athletics, in general. Specifically, it appears the money and the overall unique nature of college athletes is influential in developing a context whereby college athletes are separate and unique from their surrounding community (Coakley, 2006).

LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
All of the previous results and discussions, however, should be taken with caution. While this analysis attempts to highlight some basic differences between dichotomous groups, more research needs to be done on this subject. In particular, more research from multiple college campuses randomly selected from around the nation to account for regional biases needs to be done. The study’s use of one campus lends a “case study” feel to the analysis illustrating some potentially useful ideas, but the statistical results could be explicated by engaging in more detailed multivariate analyses. Moreover, the inclusion of different types of campuses and athletic programs, such as Division IAA, Division II, Division
III, or NAIA, could greatly enhance hubris research by isolating whether the “elite” status of the athlete refers to the sport the athlete plays, or the level on which the athlete plays their sport.

In addition, the validity of the proxies used to represent dimensions of hubris could be another study limitation. Future research into the area of hubris and college athletes should focus on more elaborate multivariate analysis, such as developing scales that explicitly measure operationalized dimensions of hubris. In addition, more qualitative based analyses, such as in-depth interviews or participant observations, could be used to better understand the social environment of elite college athletes, especially those in the revenue generating sports within the sport-entertainment industry. For example, Lawrence (2005) engaged in a qualitative examination of the meaning and context of sports for African-Americans as a better means for understanding minority participation in sport.

Finally, Feldman and Matjasko (2005) note sport participation can promote or inhibit adolescent deviance based upon differences between athletes in different sports. Specifically, as identified in the concept of hubris, elite athletes on elite teams are more likely to develop these personality characteristics. Athletes in non-revenue generating sports (e.g. water polo) are probably not going to feel separate and “above” the community around them. Athletes in revenue generating sports, in conjunction with the commercialization of college sports and the proliferation of college sport media coverage, have a “celebrity” status and are under public scrutiny more so than other athletes or the traditional college student (Coakley, 2004). This analysis, however, is the first research to start discussion of the concept of hubris as directly applied to college athletes. The differences between athletes and non-athletes and those noted when controlling for gender and race on this college campus illustrate some starting points for future research.

REFERENCES


### Table 1:
Demographic Characteristics of Survey Sample (n=518)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>%</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Class</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freshmen</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>45.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sophomore</td>
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</tr>
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<td>18.1</td>
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<td>Graduate Student</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
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<td>245</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>273</td>
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<td><strong>Status</strong></td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part-time</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Live in University Housing</strong></td>
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<td>50.0</td>
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<td>50.0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Race</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White, non-Hispanic</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>80.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-white</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Because “age” is continuous, the mean age of the sample is reported within the “%” column. In addition, the range of the “age” category varied from 18-to-51 years old.*
Table 2:  
Mean Differences along Hubris Indicators between Athletes and Non-athletes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Athlete</th>
<th>Non-athlete</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Standard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deviation</td>
<td>Significance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Perceptions</td>
<td>24.13</td>
<td>4.40</td>
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<td>Self-Protection</td>
<td>8.26</td>
<td>4.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victimization</td>
<td>7.77</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance=*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table 3:
Mean Differences along Hubris Indicators between Male Athletes and Male non-athletes (n=245)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Athlete</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Non-athlete</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Standard</td>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Standard</td>
<td>Significance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Perceptions</td>
<td>24.90</td>
<td>4.76</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>23.53</td>
<td>4.91</td>
<td>*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Self-Protection</td>
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<td>3.10</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.60</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victimization</td>
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<td>0.99</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.53</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

Significance=* p<0.05
Table 4:  
*Mean Differences along Hubris Indicators between Male Athletes and Female Athletes (n=241)*

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
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<th></th>
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<th>Non-athlete</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
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<td>Mean</td>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Perceptions</td>
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<td>4.76</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>23.00</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Self-Protection</td>
<td>6.41</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>11.10</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Victimization</td>
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<td></td>
<td>7.86</td>
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Significance=*** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$
Table 5:  
*Mean Differences along Hubris Indicators between Minority Athletes and Minority non-athletes* 
\(n=101\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Athlete</th>
<th>Non-athlete</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Perceptions</td>
<td>24.87</td>
<td>3.10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Self-Protection</td>
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<tr>
<td>Victimization</td>
<td>7.60</td>
<td>0.84</td>
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Significance=*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01
Table 6:  
*Mean Differences along Hubris Indicators between White Athletes and White non-athletes (n=417)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Athlete</th>
<th>Non-athlete</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
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<tr>
<td>Police</td>
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<td>Self-victimization</td>
<td>8.43</td>
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Significance=*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01
SUMMER LEAGUE COLLEGE BASEBALL PLAYERS: DO DIETARY INTAKE AND BARRIERS TO HEALTHY EATING DIFFER BETWEEN GAME AND NON-GAME DAYS?

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REGINALD F. OVERTON, VIRGINIA STATE UNIVERSITY
ANDREW J. CUCCHIARA, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
ASHLEY B. CARPENTER, EAST CAROLINA UNIVERSITY
ASHLEY B. CORBETT, EAST CAROLINA UNIVERSITY

ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study was to examine dietary intake and barriers to healthy eating among summer league college baseball players (N=13). A total of nine 24-hour dietary intake records, including three each of non-game (NG), home game (HG), and away game (AG) days, were used to assess dietary intake and eating frequency. A survey was used to identify barriers to healthy eating. Outcomes of this study indicate: (a) participants had suboptimal dietary intake, as indicated by mean (M ± SD) total Healthy Eating Index (HEI) scores of 56 ± 5 (NG), 58 ± 6 (HG), and 56 ± 8 (AG), out of maximum possible score of 100, (b) The highest mean HEI component score for the three situations was for meat (10 ± 1 NG, 9 ± 1 HG, 9 ± 2 AG), out of a maximum possible score of 10, lowest scores included sodium (mean NG, HG, and AG range 2.3 to 2.7), cholesterol (2.8 to 4.9), fruit (3.1 to 4.1), and vegetables (4.6 to 5.1 game days), (c) 50% of dietary parameters assessed had individual effects (HEI grain, vegetable, fruit, total fat, and variety scores, and meal frequency), and (d) 92% of participants reported that having insufficient time to cook healthy was a NG barrier, having to eat out frequently was a barrier for 85% and 54% of participants for AG and NG days, and not knowing how to choose healthy foods when eating out was an AG barrier for 69%. Collectively, results indicate that summer league baseball athletes would benefit from nutrition education designed to improve dietary intake, thus promoting health and physical performance.

INTRODUCTION
Seventy-four percent of the U.S. population have diets that need improvement, and male athletes are no exception to this finding. Inadequate intake of carbohydrate and excess intake of protein (Clark, Reed, Crouse, & Armstrong, 2003), fat, saturated fat, cholesterol, and sodium have been reported among adult male athletes (Hinton, Sanford, Davidson, Yakushko, & Beck, 2004). Suboptimal dietary intake can result in persistent fatigue, poor exercise recovery, illness, and unwanted weight loss (Ray & Fowler, 2004); all of these conditions can be detrimental to sport performance. Furthermore, increased nutrient and energy intake has been found to improve athletic performance (Frentsos & Baer, 1997).

There has been surprisingly little research investigating dietary intake and barriers to healthy eating among baseball athletes, despite the finding that 48% of athletes on a Major League baseball team were found to have dyslipidemia (Cantwell, 2002). Baseball inherently has social, dietary, and environmental factors that could promote suboptimal dietary intake. Palumbo (2000) highlighted a number of these factors in a case report of a minor league baseball program, as the following: players living on a tight budget and making poor meal choices, experiencing stress associated with living away from home and learning to be on one’s own, pressure to enhance fundamental playing skills, having
diets that provide inadequate energy and fluid intake, and schedules that require frequently eating on the road and competing in a hot, humid environment.

Summer league baseball is a popular avenue taken by college players wishing to improve their skills and performance visibility for professional scouts during the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) non-competitive season. There are 12 NCAA endorsed and over 100 non-NCAA sanctioned summer leagues. Each league has 10 to 20 teams, each team has 25 to 30 players. The Coastal Plain League (CPL) is a “showcase” wood bat summer league program, sanctioned and certified by Major League Baseball and endorsed by the NCAA. A goal of showcase leagues is to provide scouts easy and frequent access to these professional prospects. CPL teams recruit from the top 10% of college players throughout the country; 50% to 60% of players will be recruited to play professional baseball (L. C. Toombs, personal communication, September 22, 2005).

There are a number of stressors experienced by CPL players that could promote suboptimal dietary intake. In the 2005 season, CPL teams traveled three or more hours to play 50% of games and played 56 games in 70 days. Players practice and compete in the southeastern region of the U.S., where 80% humidity and 90 to 100°F days are common. Game days consist of a 1.5 to 2-hour warm up, that begins at 3 PM (home game) or 5 PM (away game), and includes stretching, running sprints, and practicing position-specific drills, followed by the game. Traditionally, games begin at 7:05 PM and last two to three hours. The team is responsible for providing meals for their athletes only while traveling to away games and after home games. While traveling, meals are generally purchased at fast food restaurants. Post-game meals are provided by the home team for home team as well as visiting team athletes. The post-game meals are donated by area restaurants (pizza, pasta, sandwiches) or cooked on grills (hot dogs, hamburgers) by home team employees or volunteers. The majority of CPL players are living away from home with host families; host families provide lodging but are not responsible for meals. Finally, because CPL players are members of NCAA programs, they cannot be paid for playing summer league baseball. Thus, financial hardship throughout the summer season occurs for many players.

College athletes spend a great deal of time “on the road” during the competitive season, which results in reliance on fast food and disruption in normal eating patterns while traveling. There is a lack of research investigating dietary intake differences between competition versus non-competition days among college athletes. This research topic is important to investigate among college baseball athletes because they have rigorous competitive season schedules and the opportunity for two competitive seasons (i.e., NCAA and summer league). Understanding differences in dietary intake and barriers to eating healthy among athletes for these situations would be an important scientific contribution to the field of sport management. Sport managers, such as athletic administrators and coaches, are key personnel whom athletes rely on for performance enhancing information. Furthermore, overall wellness of the student athlete reduces the injury prevalence and other health-related problems that impact performance (and thus team competitiveness) and medical expenses.

This research is an extension of a larger research project that investigated body composition and dietary intake of summer college baseball players (Malinauskas, Overton, Corbett, & Carpenter, 2006). The purpose of this study was to investigate dietary intake and perceived barriers to eating healthy among summer league college baseball players, specifically, those playing in a “showcase” league. The research questions under investigation are as follows: (a) identify barriers to eating healthy on non-game and away game days, (b) identify if individual and situation (i.e., non-game, home game, and away game days) effects occur for dietary intake and meal frequency, and (c) identify if suboptimal dietary intake occurs for non-game, home game, and away game days.
METHODS

PARTICIPANTS
Participants were 13 male college baseball players who were members of the same Coastal Plain League (CPL) summer baseball team. This was a sample of convenience where participation was determined on a volunteer basis. After being fully informed regarding the study protocol and the risks involved, participants were asked to sign an informed consent approved by the university’s Institutional Review Board for Research with Human Subjects.

PROCEDURES
Participants met individually with a Registered Dietitian (RD) on four occasions throughout the summer league season. On the first occasion, participants had their body composition measured, completed a demographic questionnaire, and received instruction for completing dietary records. Subsequent meetings included review of dietary intake records with the RD. In an effort to provide uniform instruction and data collection, one RD provided instruction and collected all data.

BODY COMPOSITION MEASUREMENT
Anthropometric measurements were taken by one anthropometrist. Participants voided preceding the weight measurement and wore light athletic apparel (generally shorts) for body composition measurements. Weight was measured to the nearest 0.1 kg (Tanita body composition analyzer, Arlington, IL), height (Seca portable height stadiometer, Leicester, England) to 0.1 cm, and skinfolds to 0.1 mm (Harpenden skinfold caliper, Vital Signs model 68875, Country Technology, Inc., Gays Mills, WI) using the three-site (chest, abdomen, thigh) formula and American College of Sports Medicine procedures (Armstrong et al., 2005, p. 62). Skinfold measurements were converted to an estimation of body fat percentage using body density and percent body fat equations (Armstrong et al., 2005, pp. 62-63).

DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE
A sports nutritionist developed a questionnaire to assess demographic information and potential barriers to healthy eating for non-game and game days among CPL baseball athletes. The questionnaire was reviewed for content validity by four experts in this area of sport, including a former CPL player, a CPL general manager, a CPL team president, and a sport management professor who serves as a consultant to a CPL team. To pilot test the survey, a small sample of nine college baseball players completed the questionnaire. No modifications to the questionnaire were necessary, based on their responses.

DIETARY INTAKE DATA COLLECTION
Dietary intake was measured during the summer league playing season from June to August. Participants were in peak conditioning and playing competition games on a regular basis. Unweighed dietary intake records were recorded for 24-hour periods for a total of nine days, including three non-consecutive non-game, home game, and away game days, respectively. The information provided on each record included amounts and descriptions of all foods and beverages consumed and time of consumption. A three-to-seven-day monitoring period is reported to provide a reasonably accurate and precise estimate of habitual energy and macronutrient intake among athletes (Magkos & Yannakoulia, 2003). Furthermore, dietary intake records have been used to assess nutrient intake of college athletes (Clark, Reed, Crouse, & Armstrong, 2003).

The RD met individually with each participant on four occasions for the purpose of collecting dietary intake data. During the first meeting, the RD provided verbal instruction and written handouts for aiding participants in accurately recording dietary intake data. The handouts included a written summary of the verbal instructions, examples of correct units for reporting food and beverage consumption (e.g., 3 cups vs. 1 bowl of cereal), examples of portion sizes in relation to common household objects, three blank recording forms, and a sample record, to illustrate the specificity and detail of
reporting participants were requested to follow. Participants were instructed to staple food packages to the dietary intake records if they ate convenience foods (e.g., Skittles® candy) and report specific menu items from restaurants (e.g., Applebee’s® honey BBQ chicken sandwich) and convenience stores (e.g., Wawa® roasted chicken Caesar wrap) on their records. During each of the three subsequent meetings, participants reviewed with the RD three complete records at a time, and received the next set of blank records (meetings 2 and 3). Food models, household measuring utensils (e.g., teaspoon, tablespoon, cup), sport drink containers, and packages from foods commonly consumed by baseball athletes (e.g., sports drinks, sunflower seed packages, energy bars such as Snickers Marathon®) were used by the RD during each meeting to visually illustrate portion sizes.

EATING FREQUENCY ASSESSMENT
Mean number of daily eating occasions were calculated for each athlete for each situation (i.e., non-game, home game, and away game days) using the method described by Drummond and colleagues (1998).

DIETARY INTAKE ASSESSMENT
Mean energy intake and healthy eating index (HEI) scores were calculated for each athlete for each situation using the interactive healthy eating index tool (Interactive Healthy Eating Index, n.d.). The HEI, which contains 10 component scores and a total score, was designed to assess various aspects of a healthful diet as compared to recommendations for the general public, of specified age and gender groups (Basiotis, Carlson, Gerrior, Juan, & Lino, 2002). HEI components 1 to 5 measure the degree to which the diet conforms to serving recommendations for grains (e.g., bread, cereal, rice, pasta), vegetables, fruits, milk (e.g., milk, yogurt, cheese), and meat (e.g., meat, poultry, fish, dry beans, eggs, and nuts), 6 and 7 measure total fat and saturated fat intake as a percentage of total energy (i.e., calorie) intake, 8 and 9 measure total cholesterol and sodium intake, and 10 examines diet variety. Each of the 10 components is assigned a score ranging from 0 to 10, the higher the score, the closer the diet is to meeting recommendations for that component. For males, age 19 to 24 years, the criteria for maximum component scores of 10 are based on a 2900 calories per day diet plan, including 11 servings of grain, 5 vegetable, 4 fruit, 3 milk, and 2.8 (7 ounces total) meat, 30% or less calories from fat, less than 10% of calories from saturated fat, 300 mg or less cholesterol, 2400 mg or less sodium, and 8 or more different items in a day for variety. Criteria for minimum component scores of 0 were 0 servings of grain, vegetable, fruit, milk, or meat, respectively, 45% or more calories from fat, 15% or more calories from saturated fat, 450 mg or more cholesterol, 4800 mg or more sodium, and 3 or fewer different items in a day for variety. Intermediate scores were computed proportionate to the 0 and 10 criteria for each component. Thus, low component scores indicate poor compliance with recommendations for that diet aspect.

The HEI total score is a sum of each of the component scores, having a maximum possible score of 100. A HEI total score greater than 80 indicates a “good” diet, 51 to 80 implies diet “needs improvement”, and scores of 50 or lower reflect “poor” diet (Basiotis, Carlson, Gerrior, Juan, & Lino, 2002). The HEI was recently used to examine diet quality and its association with C-reactive protein, an inflammatory marker related to cardiovascular disease (Ford, Mokdad, & Liu, 2005).

ASSESSMENT OF UNDER-REPORTING
The ratio of energy intake (EI) to basal metabolic rate (BMR; EI:BMR) was used to identify under-reporting of dietary intake data. Energy intake was calculated from dietary intake data, basal metabolic rate was estimated from the Dietary Reference Intakes estimated energy requirements for men, which is derived from a regression equation based on the doubly labeled water technique (Food and Nutrition Board, 2002). Participants were excluded if the mean intake for any of the three situations (i.e., non-game, home game, or away game days) had an EI:BMR less than or equal to 0.9 (Farajian, Kavouras, Yannakoulia, & Sidossis, 2004).
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Analysis were performed using JMP IN® software, version 5.0 (Sall, Creighton, & Lehman, 2005). Descriptive analysis included means and standard deviations. Subsequent data analysis involved analysis of variance appropriate for one-way repeated measures design with comparison for all pairs that were significantly different using Student’s t test unadjusted for multiple testing. A significant level of .05 was used for statistical analysis.

RESULTS
Overall, 28 athletes were recruited to participate in the study. However, 11 were ineligible because they were released from the CPL team before complete dietary data was collected. Players were released because of poor performance (n=5), medical (n=3), and personal (n=2) reasons, and being recruited to play for a Major League Baseball organization (n=1). An additional four were excluded due to underreporting of dietary intake data. The final sample size was 13, which was a 46% participation rate for male baseball players from the CPL team surveyed. Mean age of participation was 20.5 ± 1.3 years (M ± SD). The majority (77%) of participants were White, the remaining 23% were Asian/Pacific Islander, Black, or Hispanic. Asthma was the only chronic or persistent medical condition present, reported by 15% of participants.

In regard to anthropometric measurements of participants, mean height was 72.4 ± 1.8 inches, weight 197.6 ± 26.2 pounds, body mass index 26.6 ± 2.6 kg/m², and body fat 12.2 ± 2.6%. Estimated energy needs were 3178 ± 239 calories/day (32.4 ± 1.8 calories/kg) (Food and Nutrition Board, 2002). Mean calorie intake was 3161 ± 709 cal/d (35.4 ± 8 cal/kg) on non-game, 2968 ± 26 cal/d (33.4 ± 7.5 cal/kg) for home game, and 2679 ± 701 cal/d (33.5 ± 8.1 cal/kg) for away game days. Caloric intake did not differ between non-game and home game days, and was 99.5 ± 22% of estimated needs on non-game days, 93.7 ± 20.0% on home game, and 94.0 ± 22.1% on away game days, F (2, 36)=0.3, p=.74.

Regarding question one, non-game and away game day barriers for healthy eating are reported in Table 1. We defined substantial barriers as those for which a majority of participants reported a “yes” response. Having to eat out frequently was a substantial barrier, as indicated by 85% of participants on away game days and 54% on non-game days. Having insufficient time to cook healthy was reported by 92% of participants to be a non-game day barrier; whereas not knowing how to choose healthy foods when eating out was reported by 69% of participants as an away game day barrier.

Concerning question two, individual and situation effects for dietary intake, based on Healthy Eating Index (HEI) scores, and meal frequency, are reported in Table 2. Significant individual differences were found for HEI grain, vegetable, fruit, total fat, and variety scores, and meal frequency. Significant situation effects were found for HEI grain, vegetable, and saturated fat scores. Grain intake was closest to the recommendation of 11 servings on away game days, as indicated by a mean HEI grain score of 8.6 out of a maximum possible score of 10, which was significantly greater than scores for home game (7.4) and non-game (7.1) days. Vegetable intake was closest to the recommendation of 5 servings on non-game days and the recommendation of less than 10% of calories from saturated fat on home game days (see Table 3).

Referring to question three, mean total HEI score ranged 55.9 to 57.9 out of a maximum possible score of 100, indicating the diet needs improvement for non-game as well as game days (see Table 3). The highest mean HEI component score was for meat, having mean score of 9.7 out of a maximum possible score of 10 for non-game, 8.9 for home game, and 9.1 for away game days. The next highest HEI component scores were grain and variety; whereas the lowest included sodium, cholesterol, fruit, and game day vegetable intakes (see Table 3).
DISCUSSION
The purpose of this study was to investigate dietary intake and perceived barriers to healthy eating among college summer league baseball players. Despite the fact that proper nutrition is essential for athletes to meet energy demands of training and competition, to optimize performance (Dunford, 2006), and reduce oxidative stress (Watson, MacDonald-Wicks, & Garg, 2005), findings from this study indicate that the diets of college summer league baseball athletes need improvement, particularly in the areas of sodium (excess), cholesterol (excess), fruit (inadequate), and vegetable (inadequate) intakes. Most important, suboptimal dietary intake occurred for non-game, home game, and away game days.

An individualized approach to improve the diets of summer league players is supported by the finding that 50% of the dietary parameters assessed had significant individual effects, including HEI grain, vegetable, fruit, total fat, and variety scores, and meal frequency. Drummond and colleagues (1998) found that the percentage contribution of carbohydrate to total energy was positively correlated with eating frequency in adult men. Thus, increasing eating frequency, particularly of food groups that are inadequate, is a specific behavior that an athlete could set daily goals to achieve (e.g., eat three servings of fruit as multiple snacks throughout the day) and easily monitor how successful they are in accomplishing the goal.

The competition season for baseball athletes can generally be summarized as follows: “practice, play, eat, sleep, and travel” (Dunford, 2006; Palumbo, 2000). This rigorous schedule results in a number of stressors that impact the dietary intake of baseball athletes. Findings from the current study indicate that having to eat out a lot of the time was a substantial barrier to eating healthy, irrespective of game day status. Not having enough time to cook healthy (non-game days) and not knowing how to choose healthy foods when eating out were also substantial barriers. These identified barriers could be areas for which nutrition education may be most effective to support improving the diets of college summer league baseball athletes.

The findings have numerous practical applications for sport management practitioners. First, suboptimal dietary intake is common among summer league baseball athletes. Second, nutrition education strategies that focus on identifying healthy food choices while eating out and how to quickly prepare healthy foods at home are needed for college athletes who play summer league baseball. Third, because individual effects for dietary intake components are common, individualized nutrition counseling, in an effort to address dietary inadequacies, is recommended. Finally, individual effects were greater than situation effects. Thus, day-to-day eating (versus game day eating) should be the focus of strategies to improve suboptimal dietary intake to promote health and performance.

REFERENCES


Table 1  
*Non-game and Away Game Day Barriers for Healthy Eating of Summer League College Baseball Players*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>Non-game days % of participants reporting “yes” response</th>
<th>Away game days % of participants reporting “yes” response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I don’t have enough time to cook healthy</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t know how to cook healthy</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t have sufficient facilities to cook healthy</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t have enough money to buy healthy foods</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have to eat out a lot of the time</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t know how to choose healthy foods when I eat out</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthy foods don’t taste good to me</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthy foods are not convenient for me to buy</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthy foods are not convenient for me to eat</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthy foods are too expensive</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2
Individual and Situation Effects for Healthy Eating Index (HEI) Scores and Meal Frequency of Summer League College Baseball Players

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HEI grain score</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual effect</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4.62</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situation effect</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8.34</td>
<td>5.86</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEI vegetable score</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual effect</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13.83</td>
<td>9.04</td>
<td>&lt;.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situation effect</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23.37</td>
<td>15.27</td>
<td>&lt;.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEI fruit score</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>12</td>
<td>21.74</td>
<td>7.49</td>
<td>&lt;.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEI milk score</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual effect</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9.59</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>.14</td>
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<td>8.03</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>.27</td>
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<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5.77</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEI meat score</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual effect</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>.95</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEI total fat score</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual effect</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6.61</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>.02</td>
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<tr>
<td>Situation effect</td>
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<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>.84</td>
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<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEI saturated fat score</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual effect</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>1.20</td>
<td>.34</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>18.40</td>
<td>5.79</td>
<td>.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEI cholesterol score</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual effect</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7.59</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>.73</td>
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<td>15.41</td>
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<td>.26</td>
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<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10.70</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Table 2 (cont.)
Individual and Situation Effects for Healthy Eating Index (HEI) Scores and Meal Frequency of Summer League College Baseball Players

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HEI sodium score</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual effect</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7.74</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>.11</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4.37</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEI variety score</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Individual effect</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6.16</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>&lt;.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situation effect</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.25</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEI total score</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual effect</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>53.03</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situation effect</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14.88</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>33.92</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meal frequency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual effect</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situation effect</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

HEI scores are based on the average of three-day dietary food records for each situation. Situation effects refers to differences between non-game, home game, and away game days.
Table 3
Healthy Eating Index (HEI) Scores and Meal Frequency of Non-game, Home Game, and Away Game Days for Summer League College Baseball Players

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HEI component</th>
<th>Situation (M ± SD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-game days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grain</td>
<td>7.1 ± 1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetable</td>
<td>7.1 ± 2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruit</td>
<td>3.3 ± 2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk</td>
<td>5.2 ± 2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat</td>
<td>9.7 ± 0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total fat</td>
<td>6.1 ± 1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saturated fat</td>
<td>5.0 ± 2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cholesterol</td>
<td>2.8 ± 2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sodium</td>
<td>2.3 ± 2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variety</td>
<td>8.0 ± 1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total HEI score</td>
<td>56.4 ± 5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meal frequency</td>
<td>3.5 ± 0.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Means in the same row that do not share sub-scripts differ by situation effect (p<.01) using the Student's t test unadjusted for multiple testing. HEI scores are based on the average of three-day dietary food records for each situation.
FACTORS INFLUENCING THE UNIVERSITY CHOICE OF NCAA DIVISION I SOFTBALL PLAYERS

Kary Kankey, Norfolk State University
Jerome Quarterman, Florida State University

Abstract
This investigation was designed to examine the choice factors softball players considered most important when selecting a college or university of NCAA Division I member institutions. A questionnaire was used to collect data from a sample of 196 students (freshmen through seniors) of 10 NCAA Division I member institutions in the state of Ohio. Descriptive statistics were followed in the analyses of the data. Factors that were most influential for softball players’ choice of a college or university were availability of a major or academic program, head coach, career opportunities after graduation, social atmosphere of the team, and the amount of financial aid. The least influential choice factors were friends, affiliation of the university (religion, public, private), media coverage, softball team Web site, softball team sponsorships, high school coach, and ethnic or gender ratio of the university. Recommendations for college softball coaches and all staff members involved in recruiting softball players of NCAA Division I are discussed in the article as well as recommendations for further research.

INTRODUCTION
The majority of colleges in the United States sponsor intercollegiate athletics for their students. Since 1910, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) has governed intercollegiate athletics. Including provisional members, 1,258 colleges and universities are members of the NCAA (2003). One of the NCAA championship sports is softball. NCAA figures from January 2000 show that 853 NCAA institutions sponsored softball (NCAA, 2000). Of 25 most popular intercollegiate sports for women, softball was ranked as number six, following basketball, volleyball, soccer, tennis, and cross country (“Acosta-Carpenter Study,” 2002). In the 1996 Olympics, the first year softball was a medal sport, the U.S. Olympic softball team captured the gold medal.

Every year, thousands of high school seniors graduate and enter colleges and universities in the fall. This is a complicated and difficult choice because there are over 4,000 institutions from which to choose in the United States. According to the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES, 2000), higher education enrollment increased 16% between 1985 and 1995, including a 23% increase in enrollment by females. Choosing a college or university to attend is one of the most important decisions people make (Doyle & Gaeth, 1990). Admissions personnel have attempted to determine how to attract students to their colleges and what factors impact students’ decisions to remain at one college for their entire degree matriculation (Martin & Dixon, 1991).

Students have a difficult choice when it comes to choosing a college or university. There are many reasons to choose or not to choose to attend a particular college or university. For those students who are interested in playing collegiate softball, the choice process may, or may not in some instances, become more difficult. For coaches, recruiting is an essential task that is necessary in order to sustain an athletic program. Recruiting is also competitive and expensive, so any extra information on the choices of softball players may be helpful to coaches. The intent of this study is to provide collegiate softball coaches with a tool that will improve the recruiting process and raise awareness as to what softball players look for in a college/university and a softball program. In particular, this study reports the development of an instrument for assessing the choice factors that influence softball athletes to attend a particular college or university. A review of the literature of the theoretical frame-
works and evidence of reliability and validity of the instrument are described in the following sections.

LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature review was conducted to identify and evaluate existing studies of (a) choice factors of college/university students in general, (b) choice factors of student-athletes in general, and (c) choice factors by gender and specific sport teams. The current investigation empirically evaluated the choice factors of softball players who made the decision to attend an NCAA Division I program. In addition, a critical analysis was made of the review in order to provide rationale for the current investigation. The interest of examining choice factors of softball athletes in member institution of NCAA Division I was investigated through research questions representative of the aforementioned areas discussed in view of the analysis of the review of literature.

Many past research efforts have attempted to explain college/university choice factors of the general student body. In an extensive search, the authors found numerous data-based articles, theses, and dissertations that investigated choice factors of college/university students in general. A list of such studies includes but is not limited to studies by Ash (1987), Astin (1965), Canale, Dunlap, Britt, and Donahue (1996), Discenza, Ferguson, and Wisner (1985), Erdmann (1983), Espinoza (2001), Espiritu (1982), Friedman (1984), Gorman (1976), Hiscocks (1996), H. D. Johnson (1994), Kaufman and Creamer (1991), Kealey and Rockel (1987), Koch (1981), Loury and Garman (1995), Martin and Dixon (1991), Sanders (1986), Simmons (1969), Stordahl (1970), and Weiler (1996). Common findings of the general student body in the literature revealed that such factors as parents/guardians, friends, financial assistance, reputation of the academic program, program availability, and location of the institutions have repeatedly surfaced as most influential for students when making a choice of a college or university (Dixon & Martin, 1991; Galotti & Mark, 1994; Hu & Hossler, 2000; Sevier, 1991). For example, Dixon and Martin (1991) reported that factors such as parents, reputation of the academic program, availability of financial aid, and location of the institution were repeatedly surfaced in the literature as most influential for the general student body.

Although not as plentiful as the studies of the general college/university studies, there has been a growing body of literature on the college choice decisions of student-athletes in general. For more than two decades, a list of such studies includes but is not limited to the following:

- Football: Kraft and Dickerson (1996).

A short list of such studies shows that four factors were repeatedly found to be important to student-athletes in general: (a) the opportunity to play (Forseth, 1987; E. A. Johnson, 1972; Konnert & Giese, 1987; Slabik, 1995); (b) academic factors (Bukowski, 1995; Cook, 1994; Forseth, 1987; Mathes & Gurney, 1985; Reynaud, 1998; Slabik, 1995); (c) amount of scholarship (Doyle & Gaeth, 1990; Ulferts, 1992); and (d) head coach (Cook, 1994; Mathes & Gurney, 1985; Slabik, 1995). For example, Mathes and Gurney (1985) surveyed 231 male and female athletes in revenue and non-revenue producing
sports receiving full and partial scholarships. They found that the athletes placed the most importance on academic characteristics, the coach, and the campus.

While a growing body of literature exists on college choice of student-athletes in general, the same cannot be said for similar studies of factors that influence student athletes’ choice by gender and by specific sport teams. A comprehensive review of the literature review showed that a dearth of studies had examined university choice factors of female student-athletes by specific sport teams (e.g., female basketball players: Heilman, 1988, and Speer, 1992; volleyball players: Reynaud, 1998, and Widdison, 1982).

Widdison (1982) conducted one of the first sport specific studies of choice factors among female volleyball players (N=112) from an NCAA region. The most influential reasons for the volleyball players to select a college or university were (a) opportunity to play, (b) degree offered in chosen major, (c) head coach, (d) proximity to house, (e) coaching staff, (f) only scholarship offered, (g) contact of coaching staff by mail or phone, (h) opportunity to travel, (i) high school coach or coaches, (j) religion, and (k) organization of the volleyball program.

Reynaud (1998) conducted one of the latest sport studies of choice factors among Division I volleyball players. She surveyed 457 people and interviewed 8 Division I volleyball players and found that the top five factors were (a) being offered a scholarship, (b) the academic reputation of the school, (c) the head coach, (d) the school offering their preferred academic major, and (e) the players presently on the team. In general, the existing literature is very limited in its ability to provide a broad and comprehensive understanding of the college choice decisions of college student-athletes by specific sport teams.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Based on the literature search, there has not evolved a conceptual framework regarding the college choice decisions of college student-athletes by specific sport teams. Therefore, for the purpose of this investigation, the conceptual framework was guided by Hossler and Gallagher’s (1987) model. Hossler and Gallagher developed a three-stage model to describe the college selection process of individuals: the predisposition stage, a search stage, and a choice stage. During the predisposition stage, students determine whether or not they would like to continue their education beyond high school. It is during this stage that students decide if they are going to attend a college/university or pursue other options. In the second, or search stage, students begin to consider their various options in terms of college/university. According to Hossler and Gallagher, it is during this stage that there are many interactions between the college/university and the students, and both the students and the institutions are searching for the other.

The choice stage is the final stage of the college selection process. Students enter this stage when they submit applications to a small number of colleges/universities. The choice may range from one to several colleges/universities. This investigation focuses on the choice stage of the college selection process. According to Hossler and Gallagher (1987), it is this stage that students carefully contemplate the academic reputation, costs, location, and other factors of the institutions they are considering. Therefore, it is hypothesized that this conceptual model is one way to determine the choice factors that softball student-athletes consider most important in selecting a college/university of NCAA Division I status. The purpose of the current investigation was to examine the choice factors softball players considered most important when selecting a NCAA Division I college/university.

METHOD
This investigation was a descriptive cross-sectional nonprobability quantitative survey used to examine the choice factors of softball players of NCAA Division I member institutions. Data were collected
at one point in time. Participants were 196 students who included members of softball teams in NCAA Division I programs in Ohio. Of the 196 students, sophomores accounted for 29.4%, juniors 28.9%, freshmen 26.8%, and seniors 15.0%. The average age of the respondents was 19.8 years and ranged between 18 and 25 years. Nearly all of the respondents (94.1%) classified themselves as White, 2.6% classified themselves as Hispanic, 1.9% as Asians, and 1.3% as Black. Nearly two thirds (63.8%) of the respondents were on a partial athletic scholarship, one fifth (20.4%) had a full scholarship, and 15.8% (24 of 152) were not on a scholarship. The greatest percentage of the respondents (79.1%) were recruited and offered a scholarship. Nearly one fifth of the respondents (18.3%) were walk-ons and not offered a scholarship. Less than 3% were recruited and not offered an athletic scholarship. Table 1 provides descriptive measures of the choice factors for the total sample.

Once the questionnaire was revised for content validity and tested for reliability, it was mailed to all softball coaches of NCAA Division I member institutions in Ohio.

The survey packet was accompanied by a cover letter signed by the researchers including 20 copies of the questionnaire, instructions for administering the questionnaire to the team, and a self-addressed, stamped envelope for returning the survey. The coaches were provided instructions for administering the questionnaire to the members of their softball teams. Some of the instructions were to (a) explain the purpose of the study to the team members, (b) administer the questionnaire to all of the team members at one time, (c) inform the team that participation was voluntary and confidential, and (d) not have any members of the coaching staff present during the administration of the questionnaire. The coaching staff was advised not to be present during administration of the survey in order to limit and control any influence the coaching staff might have on the responses. To ensure anonymity, each team was identified by a code. The data were analyzed using descriptive statistics of the means, standard deviations, and percentages of participants who expressed agreement (extremely important or very important) of the choice factors.

Using the frameworks of Forseth (1987), Mathes and Gurney (1985) and Reynaud (1998) a 37 item questionnaire was developed. Participants were required to respond to the items on a five-point scale ranging 5 (extremely important) to 1 (unimportant). Other items addressed in the questionnaire were ones to capture a demographic profile of each participant. This section of the questionnaire consisted of 14 closed-ended questions and 3 open-ended questions.

The questionnaire was pre-tested with a small panel of coaches to establish its content validity. The panel consisted of 2 coaches of NCAA Division I softball programs. Each member of the panel critically analyzed the instrument and made suggestions for its improvement. The recommendations of the coaches were incorporated into the final draft of the survey. Internal consistency of the performance of the 37-Likert type scale items, computed by the Cronbach alpha coefficient, was .79.

Data collection occurred over a two-month period. Initially, permission for all data collection procedures was obtained in advance from each of the participating university institutional review boards. Participation in this investigation was completely voluntary and confidential. No individual or institutional names were included on the survey. Therefore, one would be unable to link the responses with a particular softball coach, team, or individual of a team. Useable questionnaires were returned from 10 (90.9%) of the 11 programs. On average, 15 individual softball student-athletes responded from each of the 10 universities. A total of 196 questionnaires were completed and returned from the participants in the current investigation.

RESULTS

From a descriptive analysis, college softball players of NCAA Division I programs considered availability of major or academic program, head coach, career opportunities after graduation, and social at-
mosphere of the team to be the most important college choice factors, respectively. The least important college choice factors included my friends, affiliation of the university (religious, public, private, etc.), media coverage, softball Web site, softball team sponsorships, high school coach, and ethnic or gender ratio of the university.

Means, standard deviations, and percentages were performed to analyze the responses for each of the 37 choice factors as summarized in Table 1. When looking at the means, three fourths (29 or 78.4%) of the fixed factors were rated above the mid-point (M=3.00) of the scale. Additionally, nearly half (17 or 46.0%) of such factors were also rated as very important by more than 60 percent of the participants. For example, the six most highly rated factors were availability of major or academic program (M=4.33, SD=0.94) and head coach (M=4.28, SD=0.89) rated by 80% or more of the respondents as extremely important or very important. The means of four factors were rated as 4.00 or higher and were rated as extremely important or very important by more than 75% of the respondents: (a) availability of major or academic program (M=4.33, SD=0.94); (b) head coach (M=4.28, SD=0.89); (c) career opportunities after graduation (M=4.25, SD=0.84); and (d) social atmosphere of the team (M=4.04, SD=1.00). Over two thirds of the factors had a mean between 3.00 and 3.99.

The means of eight factors were rated below the midpoint (M=3.00) of the scale: (a) fan support of the softball team (M=2.88, SD=1.08); (b) friends (M=2.64, SD=1.33); (c) affiliation of the university (M=2.60, SD=1.14); (d) media coverage (M=2.36, SD=0.98); (e) softball team Web site (M=2.31, SD=1.20); (f) softball team sponsorships (M=2.25, SD=1.30); (g) my high school coach (M=2.16, SD=1.33); and (h) ethnic or gender ratio of the university (M=1.85, SD=1.05). Ethnic or gender ratio was rated by only 8.4% of the respondents as extremely important or very important.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NCAA DIVISION I SOFTBALL COACHES
First, they must be cognizant that there are a variety of factors that may have significant influence on the choice of softball student athletes when selecting a university of an NCAA Division I member institution. Based on the ratings of the softball student-athletes in the current investigation, there are certain factors that coaches and their staff must give special attention for enhancement of the recruitment of such prospects for NCAA Division I programs. Second, the head coaches themselves must be directly involved in the recruiting process. This finding was similar to those in earlier studies by Adler and Adler (1991), Mathes and Gurney (1985), and Reynaud (1998). Head coaches have a great deal of influence, interaction, and contact with their players while they are in college. The influence of head coaches extends off the playing field, and they often act as role models for their players. It is taken that coaches cannot control which student athlete will attend their respective universities and participate in softball, however, when they are knowledgeable about the most influential factors and are directly involved in the recruiting process, they will be able to increase the likelihood of a student enrolling at their respective university.

Third, it was revealed that potential softball student-athletes be involved in meaningful academic-related events during the recruiting process. Kraft and Dickerson (1996) suggested that a team’s academic advisor as well as faculty within the student-athlete’s major area be involved in the recruiting process prior and during the campus visit. This approach would be important since the availability of an academic major was another factor that influenced the softball prospects in the current investigation. This further implies that the prospects acknowledge that a softball scholarship is one of the elements used for obtaining an education; however, a good education is still the primary goal.

A fourth measure is that recruiting personnel must make known the possible career opportunities post graduation to softball student athletes. This finding may be attributed to limited opportunities for females to participate as professional softball players. The Women’s Pro Softball League is a fledgling professional softball league but not a career option for collegiate softball players such as Major
League Baseball, the National Basketball Association, or the Women’s National Basketball Association. This may explain why two of the top three factors career opportunities after graduation dealt with the academic aspect of higher education. These findings parallel those of previous studies (Forseth 1987; Mathes & Gurney, 1985; Reynaud, 1998; Slabik, 1995).

Special attention must also be given to the amount of financial aid offered in a Division I softball program, which was considered important by the sample in the current study. This finding is consistent with those reported in earlier studies by Doyle and Gaeth (1990), Reynaud (1998), and Slabik (1995). In addition, softball is classified as an equivalency sport in which a softball coach can divide 12 scholarships between a larger number of players for a softball program. For example, the coach may offer 18 partial scholarships instead of 12 full scholarships. Based on NCAA guidelines, women’s basketball and volleyball are classified as “head count sports”; therefore, the number of athletes cannot be increased by head count as in softball.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
While the list is not conclusive, four recommendations are offered in reference to the current investigation. The first recommendation is to replicate this study with only one institution using a longitudinal approach. While the results may be less generalizable, an examination of one program every year for five or more years would enable the coach/researcher to compare the choice factors of the students who were accepted and declined admission or participation with those who were accepted and participating on the team.

A second recommendation is to replicate the study with a larger sample size using probability sampling procedures. It is suggested that a proportionally stratified random sample be used to obtain adequate representation from different racial groups (e.g., African Americans, Asian Americans, Hispanic Americans, international players from other cultures, etc.) as well as European or White Americans. Nearly all of the participants (94.1%) in the current investigation identified themselves as European or White Americans. The current investigation was limited in scope since it was a nonprobability convenience sample consisting of 196 softball players from Division I programs within the state of Ohio. Probability sampling would allow for ways to analyze similarities and differences among the various subcultures.

A third recommendation is to expand the current investigation to NCAA Divisions II and III and also programs in the National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics (NAIA). This approach would provide better means for the analysis of a variety of descriptive and inferential statistics to be conducted in determining choice factors of female student-athletes in the softball program. A fourth and final recommendation is to replicate this study using a qualitative approach. It must be realized that there were choice factors not addressed in the current scale. Using an inductive approach with open-ended questions would provide for insights from the respondents not included on the scale.

A fourth and final recommendation regarding this investigation is that researchers in the future may want to continue their efforts in developing the scale for measuring choice factors for specific sport teams. In addition, it may be that the variables for the choice factors of the scale in this investigation needs improvement to assure their validity, reliability and generalizability for specific sport teams.

This investigation has some limitations. The sampling method employed was non-probability and convenient; therefore, caution must be taken in generalizing the results. The participants in this study were student-athletes who were members of softball teams of NCAA Division I member institutions in the state of Ohio. Applying the findings of this study to comparative ones is necessary to demonstrate external validity, reliability and generalizability. Age, scholarship status, undergraduate classifica-
tion, and race were restricted in this study to control confounding effects. For future studies, it is recommended that differences in age, scholarship status, classification and race be examined.

Another potential limitation was the role of the coach or individual who administered the questionnaires to the student athletes. Although clear directions were given to ensure that the coaches administered the questionnaires anonymously, it was difficult to determine if their presence had any influence on how the participants responded.

CONCLUSIONS
Prior this investigation, Hossler and Gallagher’s model as a framework of choice had not been applied to the study of the members of intercollegiate softball programs of NCAA Division I member institutions. The findings of this investigation may be viewed as lending support for this particular conceptual framework, however, this approach in relations to softball at other competitive levels remains an open question and requires additional research.

Overall, this exploratory cross-sectional research has increased our understanding of the choice factors that softball players of NCAA Division I member institutions in the state of Ohio considered important. While the conclusions are specified to this group of athletes, the findings may have implications for intercollegiate softball programs in general. In conclusion, the results of this investigation suggest that when making a choice to select a university, their decisions are based on at least six types of choice factors: availability of major of academic program, head coach, career opportunities after graduation, social atmosphere of the team, amount of financial scholarship offered, and academic program reputation. When coaches and the recruiting personnel are aware of such factors, they can take a more proactive approach in the recruitment of student-athletes for a Division I softball program.

REFERENCES


Konnert, W., & Giese, R. (1987). College choice factors of male athletics at private NCAA Division III institutions. *College and University, 63*(1), 33-44.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>% rated extremely or very important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Availability of major or academic program</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>86.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head coach</td>
<td>4.28</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>85.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Career opportunities after graduation</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>79.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social atmosphere of the team</td>
<td>4.04</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>76.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount of financial aid offered</td>
<td>3.95</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>71.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic program reputation</td>
<td>3.90</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>63.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campus</td>
<td>3.87</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>67.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting team members</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>71.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campus visit</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>71.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic reputation of the university</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability of resources (i.e., money, equipment, etc.)</td>
<td>3.76</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>63.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant coach(es)</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>63.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location of the university</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>65.8</td>
</tr>
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<td>Overall reputation of the university</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>60.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount of athletics grant-in-aid offered</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>63.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount of playing time</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support services offered to student-athletes (i.e., tutors, study tables, etc.)</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>61.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athletics facilities (specifically for softball)</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>53.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunity to win a conference or national championship</td>
<td>3.41</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>45.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conference affiliation of the softball team</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1 (cont.)

Summary of Mean, Standard Deviation, and Percentage of Factor Choices Influencing the Decisions of NCAA Division I Softball Players to Attend a Selected College/University

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>% rated extremely or very important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>41.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Softball team’s schedule</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social life at the university</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of the university</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>45.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunity to play immediately</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>42.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of the university</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My parents</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Softball team’s tradition</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Softball team’s win/loss record</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fan support of the softball team</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My friends</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affiliation of the university</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media coverage</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Softball team Web site</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Softball team sponsorships</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My high school coach</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic or gender ratio of the university</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>8.4</td>
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Note: n=155.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
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<th>4</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Availability of major or academic program</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Head coach</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Career opportunities after graduation</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Social atmosphere of the team</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Amount of financial aid offered</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Campus visit</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Meeting team members</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>7.1</td>
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<td>8. Campus</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Location of the university</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. Availability of resources (i.e., money, equipment, etc.)</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Assistant coach(es)</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Amount of athletics grant-in-aid offered</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Support services offered to student-athletes (i.e., tutors, study tables, etc.)</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Overall reputation of the university</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Academic reputation of the university</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Amount of playing time</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Academic program reputation</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Athletics facilities (specifically for softball)</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
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<td>19. Cost of the university</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Opportunity to win a conference or national championship</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>6.5</td>
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</table>
Table 2 (cont.)

Summary of Most Important College/University Choice Factors of NCAA Division I Softball Players
Ranked by Percent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
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<tr>
<td>21. Conference affiliation of the softball team</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Opportunity to play immediately</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Housing</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Social life at the university</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. My parents</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Softball team’s schedule</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Size of the university</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Softball team’s win/loss record</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Softball team’s tradition</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Fan support of the softball team</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. My friends</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Affiliation of the university (religious, public, private)</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. My high school coach</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>22.1</td>
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<td>34. Softball team Web site</td>
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<td>14.2</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>21.3</td>
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<td>35. Softball team sponsorships</td>
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<td>9.7</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>13.6</td>
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<td>36. Media coverage</td>
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<td>9.7</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>25.8</td>
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<td>37. Ethic or gender ratio of the university</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>42.9</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Note: n=152; 5=extremely important, 4=very important, 3=moderately important, 2=slightly important, 1=unimportant.
INSIDER’S PERSPECTIVE:

MARLA TERRANOVA, DIRECTOR OF SPONSORSHIPS AND MARKETING MONTGOMERY BISCUITS, TAMPA BAY DEVIL RAYS AA AFFILIATE

BY: JASON W. LEE, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH FLORIDA

JL: Please identify your position, as well as the various roles in which you are involved in with your company?

MT: I am the Director of Sponsorships and Marketing. They are two separate departments, but they work very closely together, so it makes sense to be involved in both. On the sponsorship side, I work with ownership to develop all-inclusive, objective based packages for clients, and then oversee the execution of them by our sponsorship staff. On the marketing front, the department has a variety of different areas, such as advertising, community relations, in-game entertainment, customer service and sales support. I am involved in all of them--some more heavily than others.

JL: Please identify the origins of the Montgomery Biscuits. How did they end up in Montgomery?

MT: In 2003, Professional Sports Marketing, owned by Sherrie Myers and Tom Dickson, purchased the AA Orlando Rays franchise. At the time, Montgomery was the largest city without any type of professional sports team and was looking for one. Sherrie and Tom worked hand-in-hand with the City of Montgomery to build a new $26 million stadium in downtown Montgomery and moved the team there in time for the 2004 season.

JL: Could you detail the development of the name "Biscuits" how was it selected?

MT: In February of 2003, we held a Name-the-Team contest in Montgomery and encouraged everybody to submit their ideas. Our sister team, The Lansing Lugnuts, is pretty unique and has worked hard for that brand, so we knew we were looking for something fun. A native of Montgomery, Tripp Vickers, submitted the name "Biscuits" and we fell in love with it. Not only was it representative of the region, but it was campy, quirky, and playful and it could be used in a variety of ways. After having some preliminary logos done, we knew it could work.

JL: What advantages has your organization experienced due to its unique name? What negative feedback did you receive initially? What if any do you currently receive?

MT: Knowing that the name was going to catch people by surprise, and after going through a similar reaction in Lansing, we were prepared to answer some questions. Some people initially didn’t like the name because they are so used to the more traditional names—The Senators, the Tigers, etc. Some people thought it was making fun of the South, as opposed to celebrating it. While we initially received quite a few negative reactions (roughly 200 per day), once people saw the logo, saw the retail merchandise and understood how much fun it could be, they turned pretty quickly.
MT: As far as advantages of having such a unique name—it does get recognized. Walking through an airport, having visitors to Montgomery stop in to check it out, our website—people see Montgomery Biscuits and want to know what it is. It is also a fun brand to work with. The puns are never ending, and all of the fun marketing campaigns we can create around it have been interesting.

Examples: History in the Baking (theme for our inaugural season), Biscuits Ala Carte (single game ticket campaign), Whole Lotta’ Biscuits—Very Little Dough (season ticket campaign), The Biscuit Basket (our retail store).

JL: Aside from the unique name, what else allows your team to distinguish itself from your competitors?

MT: Minor League Baseball is a different type of business. Though we are a baseball team, we don’t consider ourselves to be in the sports business—we are in the entertainment business. We cannot control what happens on the field, but we can guarantee what goes on around it. We care about our customers and look to provide them with positively outrageous customer service. I think that sets us apart. We are constantly seeking feedback, use a variety of research techniques, and make decisions based on what we hear.

JL: The Biscuits are one of the highest selling brands in the Minor Leagues. Can you detail the success of merchandise sales and so forth? Where do you place in overall sales in Minor League baseball?

MT: Because of the uniqueness of the name, people get excited about the merchandise, placing us in the top 10 in retail sales among all Minor League Baseball teams. We have filled Internet orders for merchandise in all 50 states and 11 different countries. It has been exciting to see people embrace the Biscuits. A lot of the credit for merchandise has to be given to our buyer, Pam Hastalis and our retail manager, Monte Myers. The Biscuit Basket is about more than just t-shirts and hats—they really do have something for everybody there, and they get new merchandise constantly, keeping fans coming back.

JL: What impact have the Biscuits had on the city of Montgomery?

MT: When Sherrie and Tom brought the Biscuits to Montgomery, they wanted to provide affordable, family entertainment, and be a part of downtown economic development. On the entertainment front, we provide a venue for not only families to come, but also churches, businesses and other groups. It is a setting that works for all ages and backgrounds.

The city of Montgomery is also making great strides in revitalizing the downtown area around the ballpark. A riverwalk is currently under construction, as well as condos and a new hotel. The ballpark was the first project to bring people downtown and it has shown people that the area is safe and growing.

JL: Could you explain some of your more successful marketing and promotional endeavors?

MT: This season we hosted the MAX 2006 Southern League All-Star game. This event took a lot of work for all members of our staff. We spent a little over a year preparing for it, and in the end, it was a great experience for our fans and we were proud of what we accomplished. In addition to the game, we held the Baptist Health Fan Fest all day long, a High School Home Run Derby in addition to the Southern League Derby both presented by Alfa Insurance. The All Star Game broke our single game attendance record and really gave us the chance to showcase the city.
JL: What is the organizational philosophy that drives Biscuits?

MT: Our mission statement is pretty simple but serves as the backbone of our operation. Everybody has a framed copy on [his/her] desk, and most can probably recite it to you—

The Mission of the Montgomery Biscuits is to provide affordable, innovative entertainment and positively outrageous service while building a lasting relationship with our community.

This is the focus [of] everything we do, and we constantly re-check to make sure everything we do comes back to that objective.

JL: What community relations initiatives do you enact for the Montgomery area?

MT: In addition to standard donation packages, we have a separate arm of our operation set up—Biscuit Charities. Through Biscuit Charities, we partner with five non-profit organizations for each season. We treat these organizations like paying customers and work closely with them to find out what objectives they have as an organization and how we can help them achieve success. We then put together customized sponsorship packages for them and implement them throughout the season and even the off-season, depending on their needs. The total package [has] a value of over $125,000 and we really enjoy being able to help.

As a staff, the Biscuits also works together on community events such as the March of Dimes Walk–A–Thon, The Chili Cook Off for the Lions Club, and by becoming certified speakers on Domestic Violence Awareness to assist the Family Sunshine Center.

JL: What five words do you feel best describe the image of the Biscuits?

MT: Family
Entertainment
Community
Value
Professional

JL: What is the primary branding focus for the Biscuits?

MT: Family—Fun—Entertainment

JL: Additionally, what would you say are the three most important keys to your success and growth?

MT: Team Work—We are a small business (30 full-time employees) and though we are very departmentalized as far as day-to-day responsibilities, we are constantly depending on each other, especially during the course of the 70–game season. Whether it is pulling tarp (yes, we actually do that), moving tables, or handling customer service issues, I really think it is important to be there with a smile.

[Being] Strategic—Fully understanding objectives and purpose increases the learning curve tenfold. I try to do this by asking “why.” It is a simple question, but [it] forces people to take time and explain. Thinking through the impact of what you are doing (or not doing) leads you in the
right direction. This has helped me grow because I have been able to learn from so many other people-- ownership, peers, and even clients.

[Having] Fun--If you don’t like what you are doing you are going to be miserable. Enjoying the company I work for energizes me and just makes me want to grow. What we do here is not brain surgery-- our goal is to provide a fun experience for families. Though it is a business and we do have a lot of details to oversee, it is important to take a step back and realize that what we get to do is pretty neat.

**JL:** What impact will being the defending champions of the Southern League have on the popularity of the Biscuits?

**MT:** Though we typically do not focus on wins and losses, winning the Southern League was a great experience. The fans really got behind the team and made for a great environment. I don’t know if it will necessarily make us more popular, but it generated a lot of buzz and hopefully encouraged some more people to come out to the ballpark.

You can find out more about the Montgomery Biscuits by going to the team’s website [www.biscuitsbaseball.com](http://www.biscuitsbaseball.com).
MARKETING PROFESSIONAL SOCCER IN THE UNITED STATES: LESSONS IN EXCHANGE THEORY AND CAUSE-RELATED MARKETING

RICHARD M. SOUTHALL, UNIVERSITY OF MEMPHIS
MARK S. NAGEL, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA

INTRODUCTION
The 1994 Men’s World Cup generated near-capacity crowds at stadiums around the United States and resulted in relatively large domestic television audiences. Buoyed by this success, Major League Soccer (MLS) was founded in 1996 with several wealthy and influential owners among the league’s investors (National Soccer Hall of Fame, 2005). Similarly, the unprecedented media coverage (11.4 Nielsen rating for final), record-breaking attendance figures (90,000 at the Rose Bowl for the Women’s World Cup Finals), and the United States Women’s national team’s 1999 World Cup shootout victory over China, paved the way for the Women’s United Soccer Association’s (WUSA) founding in 2001 (Women’s United Soccer Association, 2000a). Each league’s inception was hailed - to various degrees - as proof that soccer was no longer just a fringe or niche American sport, but had finally arrived as a major professional U.S. sport.

For any new or existing sports league to successfully make the transition from niche to major professional sport league, it must have sufficient capitalization to sustain itself until sufficient revenue is generated to cover operating expenses. This economic fact-of-life requires not only that league or individual team owners are financially and emotionally committed to long-term incremental growth, but that sponsors, league administrators, and players are cognizant of the sport’s and/or league’s growth potential. It is important to remember that all sport leagues, niche or major, are supported by the same revenue sources (i.e., ticket sales, broadcast rights, sponsorship, merchandise). However, for a niche league - with its more limited fan base - to be successful, it is critical that existing revenue sources are effectively cultivated and harvested. Additionally, potential revenue sources must be identified, prospected, and obtained if the league is to experience growth in sponsorship, merchandising, attendance, and broadcast rights.

Since both MLS and the WUSA have been largely ignored by sport management scholars, this study is designed to add to the knowledge of these leagues. Exchange theory, cause-related marketing (CRM), and strategic philanthropy are the theoretical frameworks used to evaluate the leagues’ marketing successes and failures.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS
Exchange theory applies to any successful business transaction. For any transaction to succeed all parties must agree that a satisfactory value exchange has occurred (Howard & Crompton, 2004). A desired outcome is only achieved when each party is willing to act in the best interest of all stakeholders or participants (Bla lock & Wilken, 1979). Exchange theory is based upon three elements: rationality, marginal utility, and fairness (McC arville & Copeland, 1994). McC arville and Copeland contended that rationality in marketing or sponsorship agreements focuses on the elucidation of all parties’ goals, achievement of stated goals, and that past favorable outcomes for participants increase the likelihood of future agreements. Conversely, if a previous agreement has not fulfilled participants’ expectations, the likelihood of any future agreement being finalized is diminished. In exchange
theory, fairness involves equitable reward distribution (McCarville & Copeland, 1994). If specific and identifiable benefits sought by an organization can be met through other more cost-effective means, it will be unlikely to agree to an initial agreement or renew an existing one (Kuzma, Shanklin, & McCally, 1993; Stotlar, 2001).

Cause-related marketing is a strategic positioning and marketing tool that publicly associates a for-profit company with a nonprofit organization and a relevant social cause or issue. Such an association links the company and the company’s product(s) directly to a social cause or organization through the implementation of a strategic marketing plan while also raising money for the nonprofit entity, thus mutually benefiting both (Polonsky & Macdonald, 2000; Pringle & Thompson, 2001). American Express’ 1983 involvement in the restoration of the Statue of Liberty is an example of a cause-related marketing campaign. Generally, an organization prefers to support “causes” that are of interest to its target market. While there may be a philanthropic motive to cause-related marketing, the efforts of a cause-related marketing campaign tend to produce relatively short-term, product-related outcomes (LeClair & Ferrell, 2000).

Strategic philanthropy involves a long-term investment by a company in a cause that provides societal benefits while also enhancing the company’s reputation (Stotlar, 2001). Such a long-term investment may require a company to endure short-term business losses for the good of the cause and for the fulfillment of the organization’s social responsibilities and long-term gain. It requires support from top management and shareholders, and coordination of corporate giving and employee volunteer programs with the overall corporate mission. This redefinition of philanthropy recognizes that while businesses should be good corporate citizens, they must not forget their fundamental obligation to their shareholders and employees, and to the company’s profit-and-loss statement.

OVERVIEW OF UNITED STATES PROFESSIONAL SOCCER
The impetus to the establishment of Major League Soccer began when the U.S. Men’s soccer team unexpectedly qualified for the 1990 World Cup. Despite limited prior World Cup success, many observers felt this event established the United States as a viable participant on the world soccer stage (“U.S. soccer history,” 2005). In 1993, in preparation for hosting the 1994 World Cup, the U.S. men’s national team embarked on an ambitious world-wide schedule. The U.S. had a successful 1994 World Cup, both on the field and in the stands. Not only did the U.S. team advance beyond round robin play (including a 1-0 loss to eventual champion Brazil), but average-game attendance was 67,000 (“U.S. soccer history”). More significantly, the tournament netted a - then record - $60 million profit (Trecker, 1998c). By 1995 MLS executives had obtained Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) sanctioning as a Division I league, but lacked investors, players, or team locations. Despite these issues, preparations went ahead for the league’s 1996 inaugural draft and opening season.

While the MLS’ foundation as a United States’ professional sports league was being laid in 1994-95, several concurrent developments reflected the growth of U.S. women’s soccer. The founding of the United States Interregional Soccer League (USISL) and the 1994 establishment of the W-League, a national amateur league that provided playing time for many top female players, was an important first step. The league played a brief exhibition schedule in 1994 and launched a full-fledged schedule in 1995 with 19 teams spread nationwide (National Soccer Hall of Fame, 2005).

In 1995, the U.S. Women’s National Team placed 3rd at the Women’s World Cup in Sweden, falling to eventual champion Norway in the semifinals 1-0, but defeating China. In February 1995, U.S. Soccer announced its intention to host the 1999 Women’s World Cup and began the formal bid process with FIFA. Reflecting the growing prowess of the women’s national team, at the 1996 Atlanta Olympics the U.S. women captured the gold medal, before a crowd of 76,000. However, the National Broadcasting
Company (NBC) did not broadcast the game, an indication that women’s soccer was still not part of the U.S. sport hierarchy.

The United States Soccer Federation’s (USSF) ambitious plans for hosting the 1999 Women’s World Cup, including utilizing large stadiums across the United States, and developing advertising and marketing campaigns to insure adequate press coverage and fan support, was contrary to the wishes and advice of FIFA, which envisioned a small regional tournament, ideally held in high school stadiums. The USSF expressed the goal of making the tournament the most successful and largest women’s sporting event in history.

The tournament was a resounding success, with much larger than expected crowds and national television coverage for many matches (Southall, Nagel, & LeGrande, 2005). The final match was played before over 90,000 Rose Bowl fans and a large national television audience (11.4 Nielsen rating) (Southall, et al.). The U. S. victory over China (5-4 on penalties) resulted in unprecedented media coverage [most notably for Brandi Chastain’s celebration]. Team members appeared on every top news program, visited the White House, and were profiled in *Time*, *Sports Illustrated*, *Newsweek*, and *People* (Southall, et al.). The media attention generated by the 1999 Women’s World Cup appeared to signal the emergence of women’s soccer as more than just a niche sport.

**MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER**

*Deep Pockets and Commitment: Lamar Hunt and Philip Anschutz*

From its inception, MLS owners knew it would take years or even decades for the league to become financially successful. The league initially implemented a *single-entity structure* to retain control of league expenses - particularly player salaries. With an initial salary cap of 1.3 million (Trecker, 1998b), the league’s investors were confident losses would not exceed the initial business plan projections. Even with player-salary cost containment, the league lost over $100 million in its first three years of operation (Trecker, 1998b). Despite these losses, in 1998 then league commissioner Doug Logan noted:

> We have a stable of investors who believe this is a wise, prudent, long-term investment. We have a solid business plan and we’re sticking with it, and that plan is reinforced by the knowledge that our backers bring to the table (Trecker, 1998c, p. 21).

*Note: In a single-entity model there are no individual team owners. Investors may be assigned a particular team, but ultimate authority for player movement, marketing strategies, television contracts, and sponsorship acquisition and retention lies with the league office (Zimbalist, 2005). While the adoption of a single-entity model allows the league to control labor costs and insure a more competitive league - through league assignment of players - such top-down control may have the unintended consequence of alienating an individual team’s fans who may feel “their” team is not doing everything it can to win (Sweet, 2001b).*

Among the league’s initial investors was one of the greatest American sports entrepreneurs, Lamar Hunt. With Hunt’s dedication, commitment and financial resources, the MLS had an initial advantage over many start-up sport properties. Hunt had long been a sport pioneer, founding the American Football League, as well as maintaining ownership positions in the Chicago Bulls, North American Soccer League’s (NASL) Dallas Tornadoes, and the World Championship Tennis Tour (Harris, 1986).
Hunt’s financial resources and his willingness to use them were legendary. In 1960, when Hunt’s father was asked to comment on the first-year $1 million dollar operating loss of Lamar’s Dallas Texans (later renamed the Kansas City Chiefs) AFL football franchise, he responded that at that rate, “the boy only has 123 years to go” (Harris, 1986, p. 105). Hunt continued to proclaim his willingness to see MLS succeed, in spite of short-term financial losses, “I know soccer’s going to get there eventually. It has done things that tell you that inevitably it is going to be big…” (Schoenfeld, 2003, p. 29).

In addition to Hunt, MLS’s other primary investor is Philip Anschutz of Anschutz Entertainment Group (AEG). Originally a $5 million investor and operator of the Colorado Rapids, Anschutz has since directly invested over $100 to maintain the league (Lisi, 2002; Sweet, 2001a). In 2001, MLS faced several challenges: (a) yearly losses in the millions, (b) cessation of team operations in Miami and Tampa Bay, and (c) the decisions by several investors – including Kenneth Horowitz, John Kluge and Stuart Subotnick – to leave the league (Sweet, 2001f). In spite of these negative developments, Anschutz reemphasized his commitment to MLS (Sweet, 2001b). Anschutz’s commitment to the league is so deep that other league executives have begun calling him “Uncle Phil” (Plagenhoef, 2003, ¶ 5).

In 2002 MLS Commissioner Don Garber noted the importance of Anschutz’s and AEG’s commitment to MLS’ future:

Having a small group of committed investors is better for the long-term success of the sport than a large number of (backers) who are unwilling to reach our goals... Anschutz and his group have made a massive commitment to the sport. Soccer needed someone to tell the naysayers, “I’m right, and you’re wrong. I’ve made bets on businesses that everyone said wouldn’t work and I’ve proved to be right. My next bet is on soccer.’ Anschutz is that person (Lisi, 2002, ¶ 11).

Until 2004, Hunt and Anschutz controlled nine of 10 MLS teams. The only other owner was Robert Kraft, operator of the New England Revolution (and more famously the owner of the NFL’s New England Patriots) (Plagenhoef, 2003). Although so few owners could conceivably control trades, draft selections, etc. greater concern has been the effect of losses being concentrated among so few investors. However, the willingness of the three league investors/owners to assume league losses totaling $250-$300 million has actually kept the league from bankruptcy (Carney, 2001). Richard Motzkin of SportsNet LLC noted, “At one end, it (teams run by one group) sounds absurd...But it would be even more absurd to have the league go bankrupt (Sweet, 2001c, p. 24). Robert Kraft recently explained his long-term commitment to MLS, noting his organization “…does not stay with businesses that either aren’t profitable or we don’t feel have the potential to be profitable” (Warfield, 2005c, p. 17).

The willingness of league investors to sustain losses in anticipation of long-term rewards appeared to be nearer to reality when, at the conclusion of the 2002 season, three MLS teams posted losses totaling less than $500,000 apiece (Trecker, 2002). More notably, in 2003 after moving into the $150 million Home Depot Center, the Los Angeles Galaxy was profitable (Warfield, 2004; Warfield, 2005c). In addition, according to league sources, lack of a naming rights deal for their new stadium was the only factor preventing the Columbus Crew from being profitable (Warfield, 2005c).

Recent MLS Successes
League owners had long sought new soccer-only facilities to enhance revenue streams, and the Home Depot Center solidified the importance of playing-facility control. The league has since agreed to build new facilities in Dallas and Denver. Significantly, the city of Chicago has agreed to build the first publicly-financed, professional soccer-only facility in the United States (Warfield, 2005c). With plans to have six of its 12 teams in soccer-only facilities by 2007, MLS investors see their sport at a “tipping point” (Lefton, 2005; Warfield, 2005c).
Building upon its recent financial success, the MLS announced league expansion to 12 teams and new investors for the 2005 season. Dave Checketts, long-time president of the NBA’s New York Knicks, purchased the rights to operate the Real Salt Lake franchise, located in Salt Lake City, UT. Checketts explained his interest, “…I think we are on the cusp of the tipping point for soccer and MLS in the U.S. There’s real upside here…Soccer is still expanding, we have opportunity and labor peace” (Lefton, 2005, pg. 32). Real Salt Lake has already announced plans for a new 25,000 seat facility to open in 2007 or 2008 (“Politically motivated…,” 2005). Signaling the growth and acceptance of the MLS in North America, legendary Mexican Soccer Club CD Guadalajara, known as Chivas, was the second 2005 entry to the MLS. Jorge Vergera’s Chivas USA will play in the Home Depot Center and should turn a profit in its first season (Lefton, 2005).

MLS investors have consistently focused on maintaining player salaries at affordable levels. During its inaugural season, each MLS team had a salary cap of $1.25 million with an individual player cap of $175,000 (“U.S. soccer history,” 2005). Initially four “marquee” league players were allowed to exceed the individual and team salary caps to pursue valuable sponsorship deals. In addition, each team was allowed a maximum of five foreign nationals per team. This restriction was designed to encourage the development and marketing of American players. In 1997, one year after the league’s inception, MLS players unionized and sued the league - claiming the single-entity structure violated antitrust laws (Sweet, 2001d). The MLS’ eventual legal victory (Fraser v. MLS, 2002) led to the 2005 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the league and the players’ union (Warfield, 2005c). This initial CBA does not expire until 2009 (Warfield, 2005c).

Since its inception, MLS has increasingly been willing and able to sign higher-priced star players and increase team salaries. In 2004, 46 players made more than $100,000, but by 2005, the first year of the new CBA, that number had increased to 63 (Warfield, 2005b). In addition, by 2005 the 27 players making the league minimums saw their salaries increase from $24,000 to $28,000 (Warfield, 2005b). The league has also recently signed world-class players (such as Landon Donovan [$900,000] and Eddie Johnson [$875,000]) by paying salaries comparable to those of established leagues around the globe (Warfield, 2005b). In another 2005 move that many feel is critical to the future marketing of U.S. soccer, MLS signed teenage star, Freddie Adu, to a base salary of $500,000 (Warfield, 2005b). Doug Quinn, Executive Vice President of the MLS, described 2005 as the first season where “…part of our whole approach to the business…is building stars” (Warfield, 2005a, pg. 33). By 2005 the 12 team MLS had player salaries totaling $23.1 million (Warfield, 2005b).

**MLS Media Outlets**

The growth of any sports enterprise requires an ability to deliver content through various media outlets. During the initial 1996 season, MLS – evidently understanding the basic tenets of exchange theory, knew it could not expect to receive large television broadcast-rights fees for its games. Instead, it paid the American Broadcast Company (ABC) $450,000 (plus production costs) to broadcast its championship game (Trecker, 1998c). However, after the league was able to sell all of the in-game advertising inventory, The Disney Company, parent company of ABC, ESPN (Entertainment and Sports Programming Network), and ESPN2, looked favorably on the league’s future prospects and negotiated a partnership in which ABC, ESPN, ESPN2, and MLS would share production costs and sales revenue (Frank, 2001). Although overall 2000 broadcast ratings declined from 1999 levels (ABC: .9 - .7; ESPN .34 - .34; ESPN2: .26-.22), 2000 ratings for 18-34 year-old males increased, indicating a potential for future ratings’ growth. In 2002, ABC and ESPN agreed to continue broadcasting MLS games, but MLS assumed responsibility for advertisement sales (“General overview,” 2005; Warfield, 2005c).

The 2004 ESPN2 ratings for MLS games, which increased 11.1% from 2003, reflected the league’s increased popularity (Warfield, 2005c). ABC’s sole broadcast produced a 1.3 rating (4 share), a 30% increase from 2003 (Warfield). Although not equal to other sports broadcasts, such as MLB, NBA or NFL
games, the 1.3 rating was still significant. This increased demand prompted ESPN2 to implement a split-screen commercial format, so viewers would not miss any game action (Warfield).

The MLS has seen progress in other broadcast agreements. MLS games have consistently enjoyed strong viewership on Spanish-language stations. As early as 1998, MLS games were the highest rated programming on Univision - drawing a 3.8 rating (Trecker, 1998c). Recently, the league announced additional soccer-specific, regional cable-televison and local-radio deals (Brockington, 2003a; Brockington, 2003b). David Sternberg, Executive Vice President and General Manager of the Fox Soccer Channel (FSC), noted his company’s interest in regional broadcasts, “We think there is a lot of upside. It is going to take time and it’s not going to happen overnight, but the indicators are pointing in the right direction” (Warfield, 2005c, p. 17).

By the 2005 season, between national and regional television deals, 95% of MLS games were broadcast on live television (“General overview”, 2005). In addition, MLS attempted to focus media attention on “Soccer Saturday’s”, by scheduling “doubleheaders” throughout the season. (“General overview”). While clearly MLS’ stature on the U.S. sports’ scene has increased, Commissioner Garber anticipated continued growth:

In time, we should be able to achieve the significant importance that the other four established sports league have achieved. When you look at demographic changes, ethnic changes, and global communication changes that are taking place, we believe soccer is poised to capitalize on those...The question is: When? And our investors are committed until that happens. I see no reason why we shouldn’t be able to achieve some of that significance in time (Lewis, 2000, ¶ 7).

**MLS Marketing Effectiveness**

The marketing effectiveness of game broadcasts is influenced by stadium aesthetics, including perceived crowd size and fan enthusiasm (Southall, et al., 2005). It is not essential that games are played in massive stadiums, but it is important that facilities appear to be near capacity and that fans are engaged. Since MLS per-game attendance (an average of 15,008 from 1996-2004) is appreciably less than the capacity of most major professional/collegiate “football” stadiums, the construction of smaller, soccer-specific stadiums is critical if MLS crowds are to overcome being overwhelmed, or lost, in such cavernous facilities (Caneveri, 2005). MLS attendance has been sufficient to sustain the league and compares favorably to NBA and NHL figures (Caneveri). In fact, MLS’ attendance growth outpaces that of the NBA during its early years. MLS commissioner Don Garber has noted the NBA took over 29 years before it exceeded 10,000 in average game attendance (Trecker, 2000). The league’s attendance figures are more significant considering that the MLS clearly cannot market itself as the world’s premier professional soccer product (Trecker, 1998b).

In addition to the construction of new, soccer-specific facilities, the acquisition and retention of star players, which in turn leads to higher quality games, appears to be critical to MLS attendance. Quality teams with star players (i.e., winning teams) including the Colorado Rapids, D.C. United, and L.A. Galaxy more often draw larger crowds. Conversely, despite initial promise, and a large Latino fanbase, a poor 2-14-3 record to start the 2005 season resulted in poor attendance figures of 17,080 per game for Chivas USA (Warfield, 2005e). Although Chivas had the fourth highest MLS attendance, it was anticipated that they would potentially lead the league.

Since MLS generates more sponsorship revenue than revenue from media contracts, such sponsorship money is a critical revenue component (Sweet, 2001e). From its inception the league has successfully attracted corporate sponsors. In 1996 alone, sponsors committed over $80 million - an average of $2 million per sponsorship (“Q&A: Doug Logan,” 1998; Trecker, 1998c). According to Tom Haidinger, MLS
Vice President of Corporate Partnerships, the league’s success in sponsorship acquisition and retention is due to dedicating staff resources to the task and also a personal-service approach. In a 2001 interview, Haidinger declared, “[W]e’re going out and sitting down with every one of our clients” (Sweet, 2001e). MLS annually generates $20 million from sponsorships and has a 90%-100% renewal rate (Sweet, 2001e). Corporate sponsors include Honda, Kraft, Anheuser Busch, and, most recently, Adidas - which signed a $150 million deal in 2005 (Warfield, 2005c). Kevin Ross, American soccer director for Adidas, said “It’s probably one of the biggest (deals) for the entire company in the last three or four years, at least in the U.S.” (Warfield, 2005d, ¶ 18). Companies, such as Pepsi, that have been involved with MLS since its inception, appreciate the league’s unique demographics. John Galloway, Pepsi’s Youth Marketing Vice-President, remarked, “It’s about reaching out to an emerging multicultural demographic in the United States. And, of all sports, soccer is a melting pot in terms of the audience that it delivers” (Warfield, 2005c, p.17).

One fan demographic group that league and individual team marketing efforts have focused on is the burgeoning U.S. Latino market. By 2000, the 35.3 million Latinos in the U.S. reflected a 58% increase from 1990 figures (Stone, 2001). In order to tap into this market, MLS has implemented “Hispanic Heritage Nights,” which involve pre-match festivals, recognition of local Latino heroes, and donations of a portion of ticket revenues to specific local Latino scholarship funds (Stone).

However, not all marketing efforts toward the Latino population have been successful. While the league has successful teams in heavily-populated Latino areas (Los Angeles, Chicago, New York), it marketing strategies were unsuccessful in Miami. MLS Manager of Hispanic Partnerships, Laina de Lima, noted, “I think people are first and foremost fans of their home country, but our goal is to make them fans of the soccer that they can watch every week in this country -and that’s MLS” (Stone, 2001, ¶ 15).

Since its founding, MLS has repeatedly undertaken new marketing efforts in an attempt to better control and direct product distribution. In 2002, AEG, in coordination with MLS, established Soccer United Marketing (SUM) (Warfield, 2005f). SUM was initiated to negotiate both Men’s and Women’s World Cup media contracts and establish marketing plans for all aspects of American soccer, particularly MLS’ marketing and merchandising activities.

MLS’ initial plan for licensed merchandise was to implement a “slow-growth plan” to prevent unsold inventory accumulation (“Q&A: Doug Logan,” 1998). As a result, the league only made $9 million in 1997, a small sum in comparison to other American sports leagues’ merchandising revenues (Trecker, 1998a). However, by 2001, MLS merchandise sales of $50 million suggested an increase in fan loyalty (Graham, 2001). Stu Crystal, MLS Vice-President of Consumer Products, highlighted the league’s intention to continue fan loyalty development through increased merchandise sales, “We want soccer fans to be closer to our game, to wear a D.C. United or Columbus Crew jersey, and to play with our new ball (Graham, 2001, p. 26).

One area in which MLS has been able to generate positive publicity and fan awareness is through the development of MLS associated youth-soccer camps. The league has established over 1,300 youth camps for children 5-12 years of age (Bernstein, 2001). These camps are attended by over 68,000 children annually (Bernstein). In addition, MLS soccer camps are sponsored by Lego (manufacturer of children’s building blocks and toys). This symbiotic sponsorship agreement not only is a revenue source for MLS, but also allows for MLS to build long-term relationships, designed to increase fan awareness and loyalty, with both parents and children (Bernstein).
WOMEN’S UNITED SOCCER ASSOCIATION

In their business plan, WUSA league founders highlighted several factors they felt supported the league’s viability: (a) the limited, but steady, growth in men’s professional soccer in the United States, (b) the continued popularity of youth soccer among young girls, (c) overall strong Women’s World Cup attendance (660,000) at various U.S. cities, and (d) a core group of recognizable and marketable female soccer players, led by Mia Hamm, Brandi Chastain, and Julie Foudy (“Relive 1999,” n.d.; Women’s United Soccer Association, 2000b). WUSA founders developed an ambitious five-year business plan predicated on their ability to develop a fan-base sufficient for the league to become a viable television commodity attractive to advertisers and/or corporate sponsors (Women’s United Soccer Association).

The WUSA’s business plan reflected a belief that people who had attended World Cup contests in 1999 were fans of women’s soccer and would attend WUSA games in sufficient numbers to convince corporate sponsors to invest in women’s professional soccer. It made sense to many people associated with the league that limited past successes in filling stadiums around the country for U.S. national team contests would translate into a flourishing future for the league. In addition, the league felt it offered a unique and cost-effective sports platform for reaching female soccer fans - both youth soccer players and their mothers. However, while women’s professional soccer was, in fact, a unique sporting experience, three years of research for one WUSA franchise uncovered evidence that the vast majority of WUSA fans were parents and young soccer-playing girls who, on average only attended one to two games per season and attended games in insufficient numbers to generate ticket revenue to either meet league expenses or justify continued sponsorship investment (Southall, LeGrande, & Nagel, 2001; Southall & LeGrande, 2002; Southall & LeGrande, 2003).

With an eight-team, single entity structure sanctioned by the USSF the WUSA was the premier women’s league in the world (Women’s United Soccer Association, 2000a). The initial league investor-operators were Jim Robbins-Cox Communications, Amos Hostetter-Pilot House Associates, LLC, Amy Banse-Comcast Corporation, Mel Huey-Time Warner Cable, Jerome Ramsey-Time Warner Cable, and John Hendricks-Women’s Professional Soccer, LLC (Women’s United Soccer Association). In addition, founding players had an equity stake in the league and a player representative on the WUSA Board of Governors (Women’s United Soccer Association).

Understanding the league would not be profitable initially, WUSA’s founders anticipated operational losses of nearly $15 million dollars from 2000 to 2003. However, in September 2003, when the WUSA announced cessation of operations, it was revealed by John Hendricks, CEO of Discovery Communications and one of the league’s founders, that “...investors... found out after the first season that they had $20 million in expenses that were not covered by revenue and realized that gap could not be bridged by increased ticket sales and merchandise sales” (Lee, 2003a, p. 4). Lynn Morgan, WUSA President, announced the league’s demise, saying, “The original business plan had some revenue assumptions built in that have proven to be unrealistic” (Lee, p. 4). League sources consistently identified the ingredient preventing the league’s survival was its inability to attract corporate sponsors (Fisher, 2003).

WUSA Expense/Revenue Analysis

However an analysis of league expenses suggests another possible ingredient was the incursion of unrealistic expenses. After $3,022,537 in start-up expenses in 2000 in preparation for the league’s 2001 inaugural season, the WUSA’s projected expenses for 2001 were $17,648,781 (Women’s United Soccer Association, 2000b). Exclusive of game-day operations, league office expenses (including $3,710,100 in “general and administrative expenses”) were projected to be $7,235,100 (Women’s United Soccer Association). Ordinarily, such expenses include items such as: salaries, rent, furniture, and overhead...
expenses associated with the league office’s daily operations (Women’s United Soccer Association). Revealingly, the approximately $3.7 million in general league expenses was over $785,000 more than the league had budgeted ($2,925,000) for yearly advertising, corporate sales, sponsor services, and public relations costs (Women’s United Soccer Association). Projected player salaries and benefits ($7,752,000) (Table 1) barely exceeded projected league office expenses ($7,235,100) (Women’s United Soccer Association).

Initially, the WUSA Board of Directors anticipated first-year (2000) league revenues of $13,222,900, for a net loss of $4,425,881 (Women’s United Soccer Association, 2000b). After two years of existence, the league had anticipated a net projected losses of $7,448,418 (Women’s United Soccer Association). However, in September 2003, when the WUSA announced that it was ceasing operations, it was revealed by John Hendricks, CEO of Discovery Communications and one of the league’s founders, that “…investors, a group of media companies and executives, found out after the first season that they had $20 million in expenses that were not covered by revenue and realized that gap could not be bridged by increased ticket sales and merchandise sales”

In analyzing WUSA operations, it can be seen that expenses, as is often the case, exceeded projections. However, such an eventuality can be dealt with if revenues are also greater than anticipated. The league’s identified projected revenue sources were ticket revenue, broadcast revenue, sponsorship revenue, licensing revenue, stadium revenue, and camp revenue (Women’s United Soccer Association, 2000b). Regular-season ticket revenue for 2001 was projected to be $3,243,000 (Women’s United Soccer Association). Reported 2001 season attendance figures show the league averaged 8,104 fans per contest (Lee, 2003b). If the average price of a 2001 ticket was merely $5, then 2001 ticket sales generated $3,403,680, which would have exceeded the projected season ticket revenue goal by approximately $160,000. Originally, the league claimed that it only needed to sell 6,500 seats for each game at an average price of $11 in order to “make things work” (Rovell, 2003). By 2003, the average 2003 WUSA ticket price was reportedly $12.50 (Isidore, 2003). Based on reported 2003 league per-game attendance figures of 6,667 (Lee), this equates to $7,000,350 in 2003 ticket revenue. If 2003 reported league attendance figures and average ticket prices were accurate, by its third year in existence the WUSA had exceeded its 2003 projected ticket revenue goal ($4,532,255) by $2,468,095. Such attendance figures should have translated into additional licensed merchandising and instructional camp revenue as well as supported the league’s bargaining position in sponsorship and television contract negotiations.

WUSA founders anticipated broadcast revenues from a national television contract at $3,000,000 per year for the first four years of league competition (Women’s United Soccer Association, 2000b). In 2000, the WUSA signed an initial four-year television broadcast contract with Turner Network Television (TNT) (“A league of their own,” 2000). While the terms of the agreement were not made public, it was reported that the WUSA actually paid TNT to broadcast a total of 22 games during the inaugural 2001 season (Isidore, 2003). First year TNT ratings of WUSA games averaged .4, equaling roughly 425,000 households (Lee, 2003a).

WUSA Sponsorship Failures
Dissatisfied with an irregular TNT broadcast schedule, WUSA executives chose to negotiate an end to the TNT agreement and, prior to the 2002 season, announced a new deal with Paxson Communications Corporation (PAX TV). During the 2002 and 2003 seasons WUSA games were broadcast during the 4-6 p.m. Saturday time slot on PAX. Recognizing that PAX TV did not have the national recognition of TNT, WUSA President Lynn Morgan still expressed satisfaction with PAX TV as a broadcast partner, “Our continuation on PAX is also a very positive step. We have a season under our belt where we have had the opportunity to educate our fans on where they can find PAX in their local markets” (“Quotesheet: WUSA season preview,” 2003, para 13). Contrary to league claims, during the
2002 and 2003 seasons evidently only a limited number of fans found WUSA games on PAX TV, since WUSA game broadcasts averaged a .1 rating (Lee, 2003a), equating to approximately 100,000 households nationwide.

Upon initial examination it appeared the WUSA had in place a substantial stable of sponsorship partners and an adequate sponsorship pool from which to draw. With initial $5 million investments from such companies as Cox Communications, Comcast Corporation, Time-Warner, and Discovery Communications, the league appeared to have adopted a vertical integration model patterned after those found in other U.S. professional sports. However, since these corporate sponsors were also league founders/investors, the initial investors’ capital investments were used to determine the perceived value of anticipated league sponsorship packages.

League founders anticipated being able to secure eight $5 million sponsorship packages from the lucrative beverage, apparel, home improvement, financial services, and athletic shoe sponsorship pool characterized by deals between the National Football League and such companies as: Pepsi ($560,000,000 over 8 years); Gatorade ($384,000,000 over 7 years); and Reebok ($250,000,000 over 10 years) (Lee, 2003a; Lefton, 2004). However, while initial investors had equity in the league, prospective charter sponsors were not offered ownership benefits. The few viable large-scale sponsors - or prospective sponsors - were reticent to purchase $5 million dollar sponsorship packages, recognizing the lack of league equity, low broadcast numbers, and a limited fan base. League attendance figures for 2001 (8,104 average per-game attendance], 2002 (6,957 - 14.2% decrease) and 2003 (6,667 - 4.2% decrease) substantiated these weaknesses (Lee, 2003b). In fact, only Hyundai and Johnson & Johnson purchased $2.5 million charter sponsorships (Lee, 2003a; “WUSA folds…,” 2003). Four companies capable of investing in a charter sponsorship (Coca-Cola, McDonald’s, Maytag, and Gillette) chose to invest only $500,000 annually (Lee, 2003a).

CONCLUSIONS
Analyzing WUSA marketing efforts involves examining the activation and non-activation of marketing strategies involving two core market sectors: (a) the youth soccer community (soccer moms/dads and female youth soccer players) and (b) adult females. The league’s ability to penetrate the youth soccer market was constrained by many young girls (players) and women (soccer moms); not being sport entertainment consumers to the same degree as young boys and men, who constitute the primary fan base of the major male professional sport leagues (Eitzen & Sage, 2003; Southall, et al., 2005). While the WUSA’s marketing efforts did reach members of the youth soccer community, unfortunately, these spectators, on average, were only persuaded to attend one to two games per season, resulting in a fan base insufficient to generate ticket revenue to meet league expenses or secure and maintain league sponsors (Southall, et al.). In addition, fears of alienating a significant percentage of the youth soccer community impeded significant activation of marketing strategies aimed at the lesbian community (Hollis Kosco, personal communication, April 8, 2002; Eddie Rockwell, personal communication, March 21, 2004).

From its inception the viability of MLS is inextricably bound to the fact that it is an extremely well-capitalized and well-supported league. In other words, league owners have extremely “deep pockets.” In 2000, one of the two principal league owners, Philip Anschutz, was among the America’s richest individuals (#6 - Forbes 400) with a net worth of $18 billion (Forbes.com, n.d.). In addition to also being extremely wealthy, Lamar Hunt is incredibly committed to U.S. professional soccer, having been involved, as both an owner and proponent since 1967. Prior to his MLS involvement Hunt had ownership interests in both United Soccer Association (USA) and NASL (Harris, 1986). Even though both of MLS’ principal investors have deep pockets, the league has consistently maintained a much lower profile among sports-entertainment properties and has not allowed expenses to significantly outpace revenues, thus allowing the league to meet its financial obligations. MLS has implemented strategies...
similar to those employed by the early NBA and NFL, which built national followings over decades, not a few years. A slow-and-steady approach to MLS expansion, solid capitalization, and a decades-long commitment to professional soccer, all have contributed to MLS’s success.

The long-term focus and understanding of its place in the marketplace also ensured that the MLS would accurately price sponsorships and media contracts. Since the MLS understood that it had little value to present to partners in an exchange, during its initial years, it readily accepted the opportunities that were available. Certainly, the league’s owners would have preferred to have received rights fees for all televised games, but the emphasis on the future rather than the present led the owners to invest in a partnership with ABC rather than demand compensation that was unlikely to materialize. That investment in nationally televised games attracted attention and fans to the sport. Many of those early fans have multiplied and the MLS’ steady approach to brand enhancement has seen recent increases in media attention and attendance. The solid 10-year foundation established by the league has resulted in two new investors and new soccer specific facilities across the U.S. With new investors and new facilities, the risks of future financial insolvency are diminished. The MLS is now in a position to offer increased value to potential partners in any potential exchange. Clearly, the future of the MLS, though not secured, is on a solid path of growth and long-term success.

Conversely, the WUSA’s demise can be traced to a flawed business model, similar to the failed United States Football League (USFL), in which league expenditures far outpaced revenues and committed financial reserves. While the WUSA had secured most, if not all, of the best female soccer players in the world, the league was unable to immediately compete with other established sport/entertainment options, particularly with male sport/entertainment properties. Given the WUSA’s cost structure and the marketplaces in which it was located, league investors lacked either the financial ability or willingness to sustain operations on the “big-league” level to which they aspired. The WUSA did control player salaries, but was unable or unwilling to keep a tight rein on other associated league expenses. Seemingly blinded by the sight of 90,000 fans in the Rose Bowl for the Women’s World Cup finals, the league attempted to buy its way into the U.S. sport consciousness, amassing close to $100,000,000 in operating losses during its three years of existence (Isidore, 2003).

The WUSA’s lack of adequate capitalization and its product’s diminished perceived value led to exactly the results predicted by exchange theory. As the league attempted to obtain sponsorships at reduced rates, prospective sponsors recognized that the ease and availability of such sponsorships reflected the lower value of such sponsorships. As a result, existing and prospective corporate partners demanded new, more valued, benefits as part of any new agreement. Unfortunately, the league had no additional, valued benefits to offer sponsors. In a last ditch effort to survive, and recognizing its decreased value as a traditional professional sports property, the WUSA attempted to utilize strategic philanthropy as a stop-gap marketing strategy.

As the league continued to be unprofitable, WUSA executives seemed convinced that CRM and strategic philanthropy, which have been used by non-profits to solidify already strong and developed relationships with for-profit corporations, would also work for the league. The WUSA had initially positioned itself as a strictly for-profit professional sport league and using exchange theory principles. Recognizing that it was not a viable, for-profit entity, the WUSA futilely attempted to switch tactics and utilize strategic philanthropy (LeClair & Ferrell, 2000). What the WUSA failed to fully grasp was that most prospective sponsors or fans did not perceive it as a charitable cause, but simply a fledgling league struggling to survive. For many casual or non-soccer fans the teams organized by the United States Soccer Association (such as the World Cup Champions) were the ones supporting the non-profit goal of enhancing the development of soccer and, more importantly, the overall development of youth participants. (“Building the future,” 2006). Since the league did not have strong fans or sponsors “psychic attachment,” typical of established “male” sport leagues such as the NFL and MLB en-
joy, it did not possess the reservoir of good-will (coupled with history of revenue generation and broadcast reach) these “established” leagues have accumulated, it could not utilize strategic philanthropy to develop cooperative ventures with sponsors.

While the surge of patriotism surrounding the United States’ women’s national team’s 1999 Women’s World Cup victory was remarkable, WUSA founders seemed to confuse (or attempt to use interchangeably) three marketing theories: exchange theory, cause marketing, and strategic philanthropy in developing their business and marketing plans. While the non-profit United States Soccer Federation was able to capture much of the fervor of the World Cup, as seen by continued increases in soccer participation, the WUSA was an entirely different entity. As can be seen by its demise, WUSA fans and sponsors consciously or subconsciously understood the basic premises of exchange theory, and the nuanced difference between philanthropy and strategic philanthropy. As a result, the WUSA was doomed to failure from its inception. The league never made the leap from a novelty item that spectators went to see once a year to a sport that had enough true fans to support it.

The MLS, in addition to having substantially greater capitalization than the WUSA, has seemingly recognized its lower perceived value among both American sports fans and prospective partners. It has operated within the confines of exchange theory and, while it has utilized CRM and strategic philanthropy, it has not resorted to these marketing strategies as the primary tool to insure the league’s survival.

Possibly in the future the WUSA will be seen as women’s professional soccer’s equivalent of the men’s NASL: a noble, but failed experiment that laid the groundwork for a future successful women’s league. Currently, it appears that MLS has matured into a sports property much better positioned to continue as a long-term viable U.S. sports league.

References


EXAMINATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH THE AUDUBON COOPERATIVE SANCTUARY PROGRAM FOR SELECTED SOUTH CAROLINA GOLF COURSES

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
There are over 17,000 golf courses within the United States and that number is continually increasing (National Golf Foundation, 2006). Accompanying these courses are environmental and social concerns that need to be addressed. One program that has attempted to address some of these issues is the Audubon Cooperative Sanctuary Program (ACSP) which is administered by Audubon International in cooperation with the United States Golf Association.

Using an environmental justice framework, both ACSP certified and non-certified golf courses in South Carolina (n=16) were examined using geographic information systems to spatially relate course locations to socioeconomic data at the Census Block Group (CBG) level. Courses were mapped using Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and CBG’s within a 1,500 meter radius of these courses were examined. Variables used in the study were race, tenure, average median household income, and occupation. Results revealed that CBG’s located within 1,500 meters of a certified course have higher average median household income and a higher average white-collar occupation than CBG’s located 1,500 meters around a non-certified course. Results indicated that there may be issues of environmental justice associated with the ACSP certified courses in South Carolina. Based on these findings, Audubon International should consider targeting courses in minority areas or areas of lower socioeconomic status in an effort to bring them into the sanctuary system and provide an improved environment.

INTRODUCTION
According to the National Golf Foundation, there are currently 17,816 golf courses in the United States. There are numerous environmental and social concerns that accompany such a large number of golf courses. To address these problems Audubon International (AI), in cooperation with the United States Golf Association (USGA), developed the Audubon Cooperative Sanctuary Program (ACSP) in 1991 for golf courses as a part of their Audubon Cooperative Sanctuary System (ACSS). There are currently more than 2,300 golf courses worldwide that have achieved membership in the ACSP (Audubon International, 2006).

The ACSS was developed to provide stewardship and education in a variety of environmental areas such as Environmental Planning, Resource Conservation, and Outreach. The ACSP was specifically tailored to the unique needs of golf courses (Audubon International). In order to become fully ACSP Certified, golf courses must attain certificates of recognition in the following six categories: Environmental Planning, Wildlife and Habitat Management, Member/Public Involvement, Integrated Pest Management, Water Conservation, and Water Quality Management (United States Golf Association, 2006). According to the 2001 Managed Lands Survey for Golf, the impact of the ACSP has been positive. In a survey of over 470 golf courses enrolled in the program, significant progress was found in a
number of areas. For example, 89% of the courses improved their irrigation system or changed application methods, resulting in an average of 1.9 million less gallons of water used per course. Over 75% of the respondents reduced both pesticide use and costs. The use of native plants in landscaping has dramatically increased and the number of acres devoted strictly to wildlife habitat has increased from 45 acres to 67 acres per golf course (Grounds Maintenance, 2002).

ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
According to Floyd and Johnson (2002), a major hurdle in analyzing environmental justice issues as they relate to recreation is the lack of a universal definition of environmental justice. Environmental justice refers to the disproportionate exposure to unwanted hazards by minorities and low-income individuals at both the individual and community level (Gerrard, 2001). This definition of environmental justice has expanded to include the disproportionate exposure and access for certain groups to desirable locations such as recreation areas (Goldman, 1996). Although few studies have been conducted that address environmental justice as it relates to recreation, some have found that proximity to recreational areas can be beneficial to the welfare of individuals (Asabere & Huffman, 1996; Floyd & Johnson, 2002; Tarrant & Cordell, 1999). Taylor (2000) goes on to assert that the lack of access or inadequate maintenance of environmental amenities in racial minority communities is a form of environmental racism.

The emergence of environmental justice as an important issue in recreation management can be linked to research which has revealed inequities in socioeconomic status for individuals exposed to environmental hazards (Albrecht, 1995). As a result of this discrimination, more attention has been directed to the issue of inequality in recreational settings (Aldy, Kramer, & Holmes, 1999; Tarrant & Cordell, 1999). It is important that environmental justice issues in recreation settings are addressed socially, as well as spatially, and that appropriate policy be implemented (Pellow, 2000). Floyd and Johnson (2002) identified three areas of research that need to be analyzed to better understand the implication of environmental justice in recreation settings. First, the nature of environmental benefits and costs need to be identified. Second, racial discrimination in relation to environmental justice in recreation settings needs to be characterized. Lastly, various dimensions of environmental justice need to be considered and expanded.

PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES
Generally, the assumption can be made that golf courses are desired land uses, although this is not always the case. Regardless, issues of environmental equity still remain with regard to resource allocation. The purpose of this study was to identify the spatial relationships between the ten ASCP certified golf courses in South Carolina and the socio-economic characteristics of the Census Block Groups (CBG’s) within 1,500 meters surrounding each of the courses.

METHODS
Due to their extremely close proximity, four of the courses have been grouped into two to make a total of eight courses. In addition the ASCP courses were compared with eight non-certified courses in South Carolina, chosen with a random numbers table, to determine whether potential issues of environmental justice are present (see Table 1). Data were gathered from the 2000 U.S. Census summary file 3 (SF3) for South Carolina using the SF3toTable data extraction program. Extracted data tables were joined to 2000 U.S. Tiger/Line spatial data files for South Carolina using Arcview 3.3 software (ESRI, Redlands, CA). Census Block Groups (CBG’s) were used because they are the smallest level of census data that includes the type of information needed and, according to the literature, are the most appropriate level for environmental justice research (Kriesel, Centner, & Keeler, 1996; Porter & Tarrant, 2001; Tarrant & Cordell, 1999).
Digital orthophotograph quarter quadrangles aerial photos from the South Carolina Department of Natural Resources were used to locate and then to digitize the golf courses. Buffer zones of 1,500 meters were then created around the courses. The 1,500 meters is consistent with previous environmental justice studies that have used GIS and one mile distances to examine the spatial distribution of population characteristics (Hamilton, 1995; Kriesal, et al., 1996; Porter & Tarrant, 2001; Tarrant & Cordell, 1999).

Once the buffer zones were completed, they were layered onto the census data and a clip was performed for each course to aggregate the features of the buffered courses and the census information. ArcView GIS Version 3.3 was used to digitize and analyze the golf courses on an IBM-compatible PC using the shape file format with an UTM projection in metric units. Geoprocessing, Image Analysis, and MrSID Image Support extensions were used in processing the data.

Socioeconomic data were examined for the CBG’s that intersected the 1,500 meter buffer around the selected courses. The authors ascertained that race, average median household income, tenure, and occupation would be best to represent the socioeconomic variables. Race was categorized as percent white, tenure as percent having been a resident before 1990, and occupation as percent white collar (comprised of management, professional, service, sales, office and related occupations).

RESULTS
Descriptive results revealed that among certified courses (n=8) the population residing within the selected CBG’s were largely white (mean=87.30%, SD=11.10%, range=32.4%) with white collar occupations (mean=84.35%, SD=6.72%, range=18.60%). They had an average median household income of $61,931.19 (SD=$17617.48, range=$54706.63) and few had become residents around the course prior to 1990 (mean=26.09%, SD=7.15%, range=18.70%) (See Table 1).

Among non-certified courses (N=8) the population residing within the selected CBG’s were also largely white (mean=70.65%, SD=20.56%, range=61.20%) with white collar occupations (mean=69.49%, SD=12.00%, range=33.30%). They had an average median household income of $42,105.55 (SD=$15870.81, range=$38953.00) and few had become residents around the course prior to 1990 (mean=33.85%, SD=10.21%, range=26.10%) (See Table 1).

An independent samples t-test revealed that the populations around the certified courses had a larger percent white collar work force (t=3.056, p<.05) and a larger average median household incomes (t=2.365, p<.05) than the populations around the non-certified courses. It should be noted that according to Levene’s test for equality of variances, variances for percent white collar were assumed unequal (F=4.947, p<.05).

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Results of this study suggest that there may be issues of environmental justice with the spatial distribution of the ACSP certified golf courses in South Carolina. The results indicate that there may be issues with occupation, income, and possibly race with the majority of the courses, being potentially desired land uses, seemingly situated in areas with a high average median household income, low non-white population, and consisting mostly of white-collar jobs.
The findings do suggest that the ACSP may be facing possible issues of environmental justice in South Carolina and may need to confront those issues by targeting courses that are in low-income minority areas and attempt to bring them into the sanctuary program. The concepts of environmental justice and environmental racism are relatively new to recreation settings but research indicates these issues do exist and need to be addressed. It is difficult to ascertain if environmental justice issues in recreation are the result of purposeful discrimination or just by happenchance but more studies such as this one need to be conducted to document and analyze this issue in the future. Until this is done it will be difficult to implement policy decisions that will enhance the quality of life for underrepresented populations with regard to recreation amenities.

There are some limitations of this study. First, the study used a very small sample size. Although the entire population of ACSP courses in South Carolina was used a larger sample size would add to the validity of the results. A second limitation is that the CBG’s are represented not only if they fell within the buffer zones, but also if they intersected with the 1,500-meter buffer zone around each of the courses. This may create possible inflation or deflation of the statistics.

Suggestions for future research would include the study being replicated using a larger sample to be able to provide stronger evidence to determine if any issues of environmental justice do exist. Also, it is interesting to note that although there was not a statistically significant difference between the courses with regard to tenure (p=.10), the low percentages (non-certified courses=33.85%, certified courses=26.09%) may suggest possible trends regarding housing around ACSP golf courses which warrants further study. Further spatial research that focuses on other types of recreational facilities also needs to be conducted. Finally, the use of GIS is relatively new to the field of recreation and attempts should be made not only to increase our knowledge of this tool, but also strive to develop the methodologies for using it.

REFERENCES


Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for ACSP Certified and Non-certified Golf Courses

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Table 2

**Independent Samples t-test**

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SMART BOOK REVIEW
FAIR AND FOUL: BEYOND THE MYTHS AND PARADOXES OF SPORT (3RD ED.).
PUBLISHER: ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD

REVIEW BY JASON W. LEE, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH FLORIDA
EDITOR, THE SMART JOURNAL

D. Stanley Eitzen adds another valuable addition to the fields of Sport Management and Sport Sociology with his third installment of *Fair and Foul: Beyond the Myths and Paradoxes of Sport*. Eitzen's approach in this work challenges readers to examine their position on various matters impacting sport. Understanding that people should be challenged to think for themselves, while seeking to provide answers to those items that are truly important, and seeing the extreme relevance in the study of sport and socio-cultural issues, Eitzen provides a path to cover a wide variety of issues in a probing and insightful manner. This work has the ability to offer up new insights and exposures to the sport experience while urging readers to be mindful and think more pragmatically about certain issues impacting study of sport.

The contents of this book are enhanced through the use of features presented in each chapter ranging from quotes from notable sport personalities, the use of case examples at the beginning of each chapter, and through the presentation of a wealth of real life information including notable historical events and notable contemporary events. The use of these features, intertwined with the other presented information, points out some important issues that for various reasons have been too commonly overlooked by students, or any other readers of this work. This oversight may have occurred for a variety of reasons including ignorance, misinformation, or mere apathy.

The title is very reflective of the book’s contents as Eitzen implements a “fair and foul” model aimed at enlightening the readers to the dichotomy of sport, while unearthing common myths that impact sport. The fair and foul analogy is a good sport euphemism to explain the approach that recognizes that sport can mirror the human experience, while being a compelling and transcending force, while at the same time, recognizing that sport contains aspects and elements that are both positive and negative.

The first chapter entitled “The Duality of Sport” serves as an introduction to the rest of the book. This introductory chapter elucidates the format used in this work by identifying the duality that exists in sport. By noting that a paradox is something that is presented in a contradictory nature or something that is a commonly accepted opinion, Eitzen lays the foundation for examining diverse array of topics that have and will continue to impact sport. Through challenging readers to view and think about sport critically, individuals can see the true impact that sport can have and this is a main part of this work’s true value.

The subsequent chapters cover a vast array of issues and paradoxical situations existing in sport. These chapters are:
• Chapter 2 is “Sport Unites, Sport Divides.” This chapter explores the potential that sport has to bring some people together and provide a barricade that separate others.

• Chapter 3 is entitled “Names, Logos, Mascots, and Flags: The Contradictory Uses of Sports Symbols” and it examines the controversy associated with the use of potentially offensive mascots and other forms of sport imagery. Though focusing primarily on Native American imagery, there is significant coverage of Confederate symbols, and gender stereotyping as well.

• Chapter 4 describes how “Sport is Fair, Sport is Foul,” through explaining the socialization process in which sport aids in achieving positive goals. This view is counteracted by examining how unethical approach can lead to an assortments of sports ills.

• Chapter 5 examines the paradox in which “Sport is Healthy, Sport is Destructive.” Clearly sport can lead to a vast array of health benefits. Such benefits have been well-documented. However, Eitzen sheds light on the unhealthy side of sport through covering such issues as injury, overtraining, unhealthy weight management activities, drug use, the influence of overly demanding parents, and coaches, and even the potential for sexual abuse.

• Chapter 6 profiles how “Sport is Expressive, Sport is Controlled” and explores how social control is a central figure in sport leading to an opportunity for positive functions such as team unity. Also, such social control can also reinforce a status quo that is not good for everyone and can be detrimental to underrepresented groups.

• Chapter 7 entitled “Myth: Sports are Played on a Level Playing Field” looks at the disparity from the “haves vs. the have nots” in collegiate sport (particularly focusing on Division I football) and comparing the advantages of large market professional teams to that of smaller markets.

• Chapter 8 explores “The Contradictions of Big-Time College Sport” by questioning the role of intercollegiate athletics at “big-time” colleges where the higher education mission of the institutions seems to be compromised through the big business involved of “big time” collegiate sport.

• Chapter 9 “The Path to Success? Myth and Reality” sums up how sport is far too often view in a “sport-as-a-way-up” mentality, in which parents and athletes themselves are naively believing that sport will lead to fame, fortune, and a lifetime of comfort, and ignoring to reality of minuscule changes of such being a true actuality for these young athletes.

• Chapter 10 “Professional Sports Franchises: Public Teams, Private Businesses” looks at (in an often pessimistic manner) the prevalence of publicly subsidized sport facilities in which wealthy team owners are able reap the benefits and financial rewards of a “reverse Robin- hood effect” [take from the poor (i.e., the average citizen) and given to the rich (team owners)].

• Chapter 11 focuses on “The Globalization of Sport” and explores global expansion of the Big 4 professional leagues (MLB, NBA, NFL, and NHL), as well as the presence of a talent migration of international player to American sport franchises. This chapter also looks at the impact of global sports figures such as Tiger Woods and Yao Ming.

Eitzen sums this work up in a concluding chapter entitled “The Challenge: Changing Sport” (Chapter 12). This chapter features “8 Problem Areas” that Eitzen identifies as needed to be addressed to make the proper reformations in sport, including: the loss of proper direction in children’s sport, con-
cern over youth and school sports are elitist, apprehension over the commercialism and other outside influences of big-time college sport, trepidation over the excessive costs associated with attending big-time college and professional sports events, unease over the prevalence of publicly subsidized professional sports facilities, and the continued need for greater equity for females (playing opportunities and conditions) and racial minorities (in leadership positions) sport.

Eitzen provides the following words of wisdom at the end of this chapter:

Sport has an incredible grip on most people. It is compelling; it can be a magical, wonderful illusion. But even as sport excites and inspires, it has problems. Let’s not get rid of sport. Let’s make it better. For me, that means sport should be more fun, more inclusive, more humanized, and more ethical (p. 234).

In regards to some constructive criticism, this text does use (though sparingly) some profanities to illuminate points or in excerpted quotes from other works. The information, which is intended to be enhance by such additions, would be just as compelling without such use and this could allow an equally effective work to be perhaps more appealing to certain audiences. Other than that, I feel that this work is ideal.

In conclusion, though used as a source of promotion, I concur with the promotional words of praise from Richard Lapchick, from the University of Central Florida, that appear on the back cover of this book when he expounded on the true value of this resource by stating:

There is no more intelligent and insightful author in America on sport and social issues. Fair and Foul will take the reader on a guided tour of all the relevant issues, challenging them to decide what is right and wrong while providing a path for the answers. This should be required reading for all students interested in sport and social issues.

I concur with this thought. I feel this work breaks down the issues in a concise, yet powerful manner.
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Editor’s Note: SMART would like to thank the guest reviewers for their involvement with the current issue. These individuals are:
- Dr. Michele Olson, Auburn University at Montgomery
- Dr. Robert Keith, Auburn University
- Dr. Edith Smith, Troy University
Submission Guidelines

The SMART Journal is a publication aimed at providing an informative reference to those interested in the study of SPORT MANAGEMENT AND RELATED TOPICS (SMART). If you are interested in contributing to this endeavor, please follow the guidelines below. Contributors are to provide appropriate identification information during any correspondence, including their full name and contact information, affiliation, and highest academic degree held.

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Authors are to submit articles following these instructions:

- **Paragraph Text:** Paragraphs are to be in block format (no paragraph indentations) and single spaced with a blank line between paragraphs.

- **Titles and Headings:** The use of headings is expected. Titles, subtitles, headings, and author names are to be left justified and in ALL CAPS.

- **Reference Citation:** All references are to be cited within the text and at the conclusion of the text on a reference page in accordance with APA 5th edition guidelines.

- **Length:** Articles should be clear and to the point. There are no word limitations or maximum word requirements.

- **Audience:** Articles should be written with sport management (and peripheral areas of study) students, academicians, and practitioners in mind.

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Send submissions as e-mail attachments in MS Word to Jason.lee@thesmartjournal.com